Module 4 · UPSC Mains GS II: Polity, Governance & International Relations

Federalism: Centre-State Relations and Devolution

Updated 18 Nov 2026 · 10,311 words · 9 sections · illustrated
Updated 20 Nov 2026
Legislative, administrative and financial relations, the Inter-State Council, and cooperative and competitive federalism.
Relations · Finance Commission · Devolution · Disputes
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ConstitutionalFoundationsAdministrativeRelationsFinancial RelationsDispute ResolutionContemporaryChallengesArt.246Art.256Art.280Art.262Art. 246 – Union, State, Concurrent ListsFinance Commission (Art. 280) – vertical devolutionvlymbooq
Centre‑State Relations Flowchart Covering Constitutional Financial Administrative Dispute — Shows the constitutional chain from distribution of powers to financial devolution and dispute resolution. · Open the full diagram →

Learning Objectives

  • Understand the fundamental concepts of Federalism: Centre-State Relations and Devolution
  • Apply key formulas and techniques to solve problems
  • Practice with exam-level questions to build speed and accuracy

1. Constitutional Foundations of Centre‑State Relations

1.1 Federal Structure in the Indian Constitution

The Indian Constitution establishes a quasi‑federal system, often described as “co‑operative federalism”. While it adopts a federal pattern of division of powers between the Union and the States, the supremacy of the Union is entrenched through several provisions. Article 1 declares India a Union of States, and Article 2 empowers Parliament to admit new territories, underscoring the central authority to re‑configure the federation. The doctrine of “pith‑and‑substance” has been used by the Supreme Court to preserve the balance of power, ensuring that legislation cannot be labelled a law on a State subject merely by changing its form.

1.2 Distribution of Legislative Powers

Legislative competence is allocated through three lists in the Seventh Schedule: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. The Union List contains 97 subjects, ranging from defence and foreign affairs to atomic energy, reflecting areas where uniform national policy is essential. The State List, with 66 subjects, includes matters such as police, public health, and agriculture, allowing states to tailor policies to local conditions. The Concurrent List, comprising 47 subjects, permits both levels to legislate, but in case of conflict, the Union law prevails under Article 254. This hierarchy ensures that national imperatives can override divergent state legislation, while still preserving a sphere for state autonomy.

1.3 The Role of the President and the Governor

The President, as the constitutional head of the Union, exercises powers that affect centre‑state relations, notably the power to promulgate ordinances when Parliament is not in session, and the authority to summon, prorogue or dissolve the Lok Sabha. The Governor, appointed by the President, acts as the Union’s representative in the state. The Governor’s discretionary powers—such as recommending President’s Rule under Article 356, or reserving certain bills for the President’s consideration—serve as a bridge between the two tiers, but have also been a source of controversy when perceived as political interference.

1.4 Evolution of Centre‑State Relations

Since independence, the balance of power has shifted. The early years witnessed a strong central bias, exemplified by the use of Article 356 in the 1950s and 1960s. The 42nd Amendment (1976) further expanded Union powers, but the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) curtailed the misuse of President’s Rule, emphasizing that it must be based on objective material. Subsequent constitutional amendments, notably the 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992), empowered local self‑government, indirectly strengthening state autonomy by devolving functions to Panchayats and Municipalities.

2. Administrative Relations and Mechanisms of Cooperation

2.1 Inter‑State Council: Composition and Functions

The Inter‑State Council, envisaged under Article 263, was constituted by the Constitution (Inter‑State Council) Act, 1990. It comprises the Union Home Minister (as chairperson), Chief Ministers of all states, and the Lieutenant Governors of Union territories. The Council serves as a forum for discussing and resolving inter‑governmental disputes, coordinating policies on matters of common interest, and recommending reforms to improve administrative efficiency. Its recommendations, though not binding, carry significant moral weight and have been instrumental in shaping policies on water sharing, transport, and disaster management.

2.2 Mechanisms of Administrative Coordination

Administrative coordination is achieved through a network of joint committees, memoranda of understanding (MoUs), and regular meetings of senior bureaucrats. The All‑India Services—Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS), and Indian Forest Service (IFS)—play a pivotal role, as officers are posted both in the Union and the states, ensuring a common administrative culture. Additionally, the Central Vigilance Commission and the Comptroller and Auditor General provide oversight that transcends jurisdictional boundaries, fostering accountability.

2.3 Cooperative Federalism: Principles and Practice

Cooperative federalism rests on the principle that the Union and the states work together to achieve national objectives while respecting each other’s constitutional domains. This is evident in joint programmes such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), where central funding is complemented by state implementation. The success of such schemes depends on clear delineation of responsibilities, transparent fund flow, and robust monitoring mechanisms. When cooperation falters, disputes often arise over jurisdiction, leading to litigation or political standoffs.

2.4 Competitive Federalism: Emerging Trends

Competitive federalism encourages states to innovate and compete in policy formulation, aiming to improve service delivery and attract investment. Examples include the implementation of Goods and Services Tax (GST) reforms, where states voluntarily aligned their tax structures to create a unified market, and the adoption of the “Make in India” initiative, prompting several states to offer fiscal incentives to manufacturers. While competition can drive efficiency, it may also exacerbate disparities if wealthier states outpace poorer ones, necessitating a balancing role for the Centre.

Comparison of Cooperative and Competitive Federalism
AspectCooperative FederalismCompetitive Federalism
Core IdeaJoint action and consensus‑buildingPolicy innovation and rivalry among states
Typical InstrumentsInter‑State Council, joint committees, shared schemesState‑level reforms, fiscal incentives, regulatory autonomy
AdvantagesUniform standards, reduced duplicationHigher efficiency, tailored solutions
RisksSlower decision‑making, possible deadlockInter‑state disparity, race to the bottom
Example Question

Discuss the role of the Finance Commission in maintaining fiscal balance between the Union and the States. Illustrate your answer with two specific recommendations made by any Finance Commission.

The Finance Commission, constituted under Article 280, is a constitutional body appointed every five years to recommend the distribution of tax revenues between the Union and the states, and to suggest measures for improving fiscal discipline. Its primary function is to ensure a fair and equitable sharing of resources, thereby reducing fiscal imbalances that could threaten the stability of the federation.

First, the Commission recommends the percentage of central taxes to be de‑centralised to the states. For instance, the 14th Finance Commission (2007‑12) suggested that 32 % of the net proceeds of taxes should be allocated to the states, a figure that reflected the need to empower states with greater fiscal autonomy.

Second, it advises on grants-in‑aid to address vertical imbalances. The 15th Finance Commission (2017‑22) introduced the “State Finance Commission” concept, recommending a “Performance‑Based Grant” to reward states that achieve higher fiscal outcomes, such as improved tax collection efficiency.

These recommendations illustrate how the Finance Commission acts as a balancing mechanism, aligning fiscal capacity with expenditure responsibilities, and fostering cooperative federalism by encouraging states to adopt prudent fiscal practices.

Exam‑Day Insight

When answering a question on centre‑state financial relations, first outline the constitutional provisions (Article 280, Finance Commission) before moving to the functional aspects (tax de‑volution, grants). This structure signals a clear grasp of both the legal framework and its practical implications.

2.5 The Inter-State Council and the Zonal Councils in Practice

Article 263 allows the President to establish an Inter-State Council to inquire into and advise upon disputes between States, to investigate subjects of common interest and to recommend better coordination of policy and action. The Council was constituted in 1990 on the recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission and is chaired by the Prime Minister, with all Chief Ministers, the Chief Ministers of Union Territories with legislatures and six Union Ministers as members. Its role is advisory: it deliberates on the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions and on centre-state issues referred to it, but it has no power to bind either level of government. The five Zonal Councils, statutory bodies created by the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, serve a parallel purpose in the northern, central, eastern, western and southern zones, and the North Eastern Council performs a similar function for the north-east. Both institutions illustrate the difference between cooperative machinery, which softens the edges of a federal dispute, and adjudicatory machinery, which decides it. They also sit alongside the constitutional rules on legislative relations and administrative relations that distribute competence between the Union and the States.

3. Financial Relations: Revenue Sharing and Devolution

3.1 Taxation Powers of the Union and the States

The Union enjoys exclusive rights to levy customs duties, income tax, corporation tax, and excise duties on certain goods, as enumerated in the Union List. States, on the other hand, can levy taxes on land, agricultural income, sales of goods (subject to GST), and professional taxes. The introduction of GST in 2017 merged many indirect taxes into a single national tax, creating a dual‑layer structure: the Central GST (CGST) and the State GST (SGST). While GST has streamlined tax administration, it also required a new mechanism for revenue sharing, overseen by the GST Council, which includes the Union Finance Minister and the finance ministers of all states.

3.2 The Finance Commission: Composition and Mandate

The Finance Commission is chaired by a distinguished economist or public administrator and includes members with expertise in finance, economics, and public policy. Its mandate extends beyond revenue sharing; it also advises on measures to augment the Consolidated Fund of the Union and the states, and on the principles governing grants-in‑aid. The Commission’s recommendations are binding on the Union, but the states may accept or reject specific grants, influencing the dynamics of fiscal federalism.

3.3 Devolution of Funds: Grants, Loans, and Shared Taxes

Devolution occurs through three main channels: (i) de‑centralised taxes, where a fixed share of Union taxes is transferred to states; (ii) grants-in‑aid, which are conditional or unconditional transfers to address specific needs such as education, health, or disaster relief; and (iii) loans, typically provided by the Centre for large‑scale infrastructure projects. The 14th Finance Commission introduced the concept of “de‑centralised revenue deficit” to assess the fiscal health of states, encouraging them to improve their own tax bases before relying on central assistance.

3.4 Fiscal Discipline and the Role of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)

The CAG audits both Union and state expenditures, ensuring that funds are utilised as intended. Its reports often highlight irregularities in fund utilisation, prompting corrective actions. Moreover, the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act imposes targets for deficit reduction, influencing both Union and state budgets. While the FRBM primarily binds the Union, many states have adopted similar fiscal responsibility legislations, reflecting a diffusion of fiscal prudence across the federation.

Key Features of Major Finance Commissions (Selected)
CommissionPeriod CoveredDe‑centralisation Share RecommendedNotable Recommendation
12th2002‑200730 %Introduction of “Performance‑Based Grants” for health and education.
14th2007‑201232 %De‑centralised revenue deficit concept.
15th2017‑202241 %State Finance Commission and incentivised grants.

4. Dispute Resolution and Institutional Safeguards

4.1 Article 356 and President’s Rule

Article 356 empowers the President to assume control of a state’s administration when the constitutional machinery fails. Historically, this provision was misused for political ends, leading to frequent dismissals of state governments. The Supreme Court, through the S.R. Bommai judgment, introduced a stringent test of “material breach” and mandated that any proclamation of President’s Rule be subject to judicial review within two months. This safeguard has reduced arbitrary dismissals and reinforced the principle of federal autonomy.

4.2 Judicial Review of Centre‑State Conflicts

The Supreme Court acts as the ultimate arbiter of centre‑state disputes. Cases such as State of West Bengal v. Union of India (regarding the GST Council) and State of Karnataka v. Union of India (water sharing) illustrate how the Court balances constitutional intent with pragmatic governance. The doctrine of “pith‑and‑substance” allows the Court to look beyond the form of legislation to its true nature, ensuring that neither level encroaches upon the other's domain.

4.3 Role of the Inter‑State Council in Dispute Settlement

Beyond advisory functions, the Inter‑State Council facilitates dialogue on contentious issues such as river water allocation, inter‑state transport, and shared infrastructure. Its recommendations have led to the formation of specialised tribunals, for example the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, which, although a judicial body, was constituted following inter‑state negotiations mediated by the Council.

4.4 Emerging Mechanisms: Digital Governance and Data Sharing

Advances in technology have introduced new platforms for cooperation. The Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) enables real‑time tracking of fund transfers between the Centre and states, reducing delays and enhancing transparency. Similarly, the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) encourages states to share health, education, and agricultural data with central agencies, fostering evidence‑based policy making while respecting data sovereignty.

5. Contemporary Challenges and the Way Forward

5.1 Fiscal Imbalance and the Need for Reform

Despite periodic adjustments by the Finance Commission, many states continue to face fiscal deficits, relying heavily on central transfers. This dependence can undermine state autonomy and create a cycle of indebtedness. Proposals such as a permanent Goods and Services Tax (GST) compensation fund, greater de‑volution of income tax, and the establishment of a “National Fiscal Council” aim to create a more predictable and equitable fiscal framework.

5.2 Asymmetric Federalism and Special Provisions

India’s federalism accommodates diversity through special provisions for certain regions, such as Article 371 (which grants special status to states like Jammu & Kashmir, Nagaland, and Assam). While these provisions recognize unique cultural and geographic contexts, they also raise questions about uniformity and the potential for inter‑state resentment. Balancing special autonomy with national integration remains a delicate task.

5.3 Strengthening Cooperative Mechanisms

To enhance cooperation, scholars recommend institutional reforms such as granting the Inter‑State Council a statutory status, expanding its membership to include civil society representatives, and mandating periodic joint reviews of major policies. Strengthening the role of the GST Council and creating a dedicated “Centre‑State Coordination Committee” for climate change mitigation could also improve policy coherence.

5.4 The Impact of Globalisation and International Obligations

International agreements, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments and climate accords, often require uniform implementation across the country. This places additional pressure on centre‑state relations, as the Union must ensure compliance while respecting state competencies. The recent push for a “National Energy Policy” illustrates how global imperatives can drive cooperative federalism, compelling states to align their renewable energy targets with national goals.

ConstitutionalFoundation — Arts.1, 246, 245–255, Seventh ScheduleLegislativeRelations — Union,State, Concurrent Lists (Seventh Schedule)AdministrativeRelations — Arts.256–263, All India Services, Inter-State CouncilFinancial Relations— Arts. 268–293,Finance Commission, GST Council, Grants-in-AidDispute Resolution& Safeguards — Art.131, Inter-State Council, Zonal CouncilsSpecial Provisions— Fifth & SixthSchedules, Union Territories, Governor, Chief MinisterConstitutional Architecture of Indian FederalismArt. 246 & Seventh Schedule: Three-fold legislative distribution (Union/State/Concurrent)Finance Commission (Art. 280) recommends vertical & horizontal devolution every five yearsvlymbooq
Constitutional Architecture of Indian Federalism — Layered view showing how the Constitution structures Centre-State relations from foundational articles to special provisions. · Open the full diagram →

The Chief Minister and the State Council of Ministers

Constitutional Position (Articles 163 and 164)

Article 163 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers, with the Chief Minister at its head, to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is required to exercise any function in his discretion. Article 164 lays down that the Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers are appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor, but since the Council is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly under Article 164(2), the pleasure of the Governor is in practice governed by the confidence of the Assembly. The Chief Minister is thus the real executive head of the State, while the Governor is the constitutional head, precisely as the Prime Minister and the President stand at the Centre.

Appointment and the Governor's Discretion

Where a single party or a pre-poll alliance commands a clear majority in the Assembly, the Governor invites its leader to be Chief Minister. Where there is a hung Assembly, the Governor must choose a person who is most likely to command a majority, and the choice is one of the recognised areas of discretionary judgement. The Governor may also dismiss a Chief Minister who has lost the confidence of the House, but the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) held that the floor of the Assembly, not the Governor's subjective satisfaction, is the proper test of majority, and that the Governor's assessment is subject to judicial review. The number of Ministers that the Chief Minister may appoint is capped by Article 164(1A), inserted by the 91st Amendment, at fifteen per cent of the total strength of the Assembly, with a minimum of twelve.

Powers and Functions of the Chief Minister

The Chief Minister is the keystone of the State government. The office allocates portfolios among the Ministers, chairs Cabinet meetings, coordinates the work of departments, and is the principal channel of communication between the Governor and the Council of Ministers. Article 167 imposes duties analogous to those of Article 78: the Chief Minister must communicate to the Governor all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the State and to proposals for legislation, furnish such information as the Governor may call for, and place before the Council any matter on which the Governor has decided that the Council's opinion should be obtained. The Chief Minister leads the Assembly's majority, steers the government's legislative programme, advises the Governor on the summoning, prorogation and dissolution of the Assembly, and recommends appointments to a range of State institutions.

Composition and Ranks of the Council

The State Council of Ministers has the same internal hierarchy as the Union Council: Cabinet Ministers who head major departments and form the inner Cabinet, Ministers of State who hold independent or attached charges, and Deputy Ministers who assist senior Ministers. Decisions are taken collectively, and the principle of collective responsibility means that every Minister must publicly support the decisions of the Council or resign. A Minister who is not a member of either House of the State Legislature must become one within six months, failing which the office lapses.

Relationship with the Governor

The relationship between the Chief Minister and the Governor is defined by Article 163 and by convention. In matters where the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council, the Chief Minister's advice is binding. In the few matters where the Governor exercises functions in his discretion, such as the choice of a Chief Minister in a hung Assembly or the reservation of a Bill for the President, the Chief Minister's advice is not binding, and the Governor's decision is subject to judicial review on grounds of malafide or irrelevance. Controversies over the Governor's discretion, the timing of floor tests and the assent to Bills are recurring themes in Indian federal politics and are frequently tested in the Mains examination.

Scheduled and Tribal Areas: The Fifth and Sixth Schedules

The Two Schedules (Article 244)

Article 244 provides for the administration of two distinct categories of territory. Clause (1) applies the Fifth Schedule to the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in States other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Clause (2) applies the Sixth Schedule to the administration of tribal areas in those four States. The distinction matters because the two schedules give very different degrees of autonomy: the Fifth Schedule integrates tribal areas within the ordinary State administration with special safeguards, while the Sixth Schedule creates autonomous self-governing institutions with legislative, executive and judicial powers.

The Fifth Schedule

Under the Fifth Schedule, the President may declare any area inhabited by Scheduled Tribes to be a Scheduled Area, and the Governor of the State is given special responsibility for its administration. Every State having Scheduled Areas must have a Tribes Advisory Council, consisting of not more than twenty members, of whom about three-fourths are to be representatives of Scheduled Tribes in the State Legislative Assembly. The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of a Scheduled Area, and may repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature in its application to that area, subject to the assent of the President. This is a significant power because it allows the Governor, with the President's assent, to modify general law in its application to tribal areas.

The Sixth Schedule

The Sixth Schedule provides for the creation of Autonomous District Councils and, within them, Regional Councils, in the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. These councils consist of elected members and a minority of nominated members. They have the power to make laws on subjects such as land, forest, inheritance, marriage, social customs and money-lending; to establish and administer schools, markets, roads and dispensaries; and to constitute village councils and courts for the trial of certain offences between Scheduled Tribe members. They also levy and collect land revenue and certain taxes and receive grants from the State government. The Sixth Schedule thus institutes a system of limited self-government, and its councils are often described as mini-legislatures within the State.

PESA and Panchayati Raj in Scheduled Areas

When the 73rd Amendment extended Panchayati Raj to the whole country, it was thought necessary to protect the traditional community institutions of tribal areas, and Parliament enacted the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, known as PESA. PESA applies to the Fifth Schedule areas and makes the Gram Sabha the cornerstone of self-governance, giving it powers over minor minerals, land alienation, forest produce, minor water bodies and the management of village markets and intoxicants, as well as the power to be consulted before land acquisition. Together, the Fifth Schedule, the Sixth Schedule and PESA define the constitutional architecture of tribal self-rule, and they remain central to debates on land, forests, mining and the displacement of tribal communities.

The Governor: Appointment, Powers and Discretion

Appointment and Tenure (Articles 153 to 156)

Article 153 provides that there shall be a Governor for each State, and the Seventh Amendment allows the same person to be appointed Governor for two or more States. The Governor is appointed by the President under Article 155 and is neither elected nor drawn from the State legislature. Under Article 156 the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President: the normal term is five years, but the holder may be removed earlier without any stated cause and may resign by addressing the President. This absence of security of tenure is the central criticism of the office, because the Governor is a nominee of the Union who can be transferred or removed at will. The Sarkaria Commission and later commissions recommended that a Governor be an eminent person from outside the State's active politics, appointed after consultation with the Chief Minister and given a fixed term; these remain conventions, not enforceable rules. A candidate must be a citizen of India who has completed thirty-five years of age, and a Governor may not be a member of either House of Parliament or of a State Legislature.

Executive and Legislative Powers (Articles 163 to 167)

Article 163 requires the Governor to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister, except where the Constitution requires him to exercise a function in his discretion. The Governor appoints the Chief Minister and, on the Chief Minister's advice, the other Ministers under Article 164; summons, prorogues and may dissolve the Legislative Assembly; addresses the House; and causes the annual budget to be laid. In the legislative field, Article 200 deals with assent to Bills: the Governor may assent, withhold assent, return a non-Money Bill for reconsideration, or reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President, who may then assent or withhold assent under Article 201. Article 213 empowers the Governor to promulgate ordinances when the legislature is not in session.

The Pardoning Power (Article 161)

Article 161 gives the Governor the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment, or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence against a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. The power is narrower than the President's under Article 72: it does not extend to death sentences, to sentences imposed by a court-martial, or to offences against Union laws. Its exercise is subject to limited judicial review. In Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) the Supreme Court held that the power must be exercised on relevant material and in accordance with the advice of the government, and in Epuru Sudhakar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2006) it held that an order under Article 161 could be quashed if it was malafide, arbitrary or passed without application of mind.

Discretionary Powers

The Constitution recognises a limited sphere of discretion. The Governor may act independently in choosing a Chief Minister when no party commands a clear majority, in dismissing a Ministry that has lost the confidence of the Assembly, in dissolving the Assembly, in reserving a Bill for the President, and in recommending the imposition of President's rule under Article 356. These powers are not absolute. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) the Supreme Court held that the floor of the Assembly is the test of majority, that the Governor's report to the President under Article 356 is subject to judicial review, and that a Ministry cannot be dismissed without giving it an opportunity to prove its majority. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) a dissolution of the Bihar Assembly based on the Governor's report was held unconstitutional. Discretion, in other words, must be exercised on relevant material and for the purpose for which it was granted.

Position and the Federal Debate

As the constitutional head of the State the Governor performs a largely ceremonial role, but the office is also the channel of communication between the State and the Union, and the Governor's report is the trigger for the use of Article 356. Critics argue that a Governor drawn from Union politics, and removable at the Union's pleasure, can be used to destabilise a State government that is not of the Union's political colour; defenders reply that the office provides continuity, ensures that the State government functions within the Constitution, and protects the interests of the Centre in matters of national concern. The recurring controversies over floor tests, the timing of Assembly sessions and the assent to Bills make the Governor one of the most litigated offices in Indian federalism.

Union Territories: Administration and the Special Case of Delhi

Constitutional Position (Articles 1, 239 and 240)

Article 1(3) describes the territory of India as comprising the territories of the States, the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule, and any other territory that may be acquired. Unlike a State, a Union Territory is not a self-contained constitutional unit: it is administered by the President acting through an Administrator or Lieutenant Governor appointed under Article 239. Article 240 allows the President to make regulations for the peace, progress and good government of certain Union Territories, and such regulations may override an Act of Parliament in its application to the territory. Union Territories differ from States in that the Union has direct legislative competence over them under Entries 1 to 3 of the Union List, and Parliament may legislate on any subject for a Union Territory under Article 246(4).

Union Territories With and Without Legislatures

Most Union Territories are administered directly; a few have a legislature. Puducherry has a Legislative Assembly under Article 239A, and the National Capital Territory of Delhi has one under Article 239AA. After the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, Jammu and Kashmir became a Union Territory with a legislature, while Ladakh became a Union Territory without one. The remaining Union Territories, such as Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu, and Lakshadweep, are administered by an Administrator or Lieutenant Governor without a legislature. Union Territories with legislatures are represented in the Rajya Sabha; Delhi and Puducherry send members to the Council of States.

The Special Case of Delhi (Article 239AA)

Delhi occupies a hybrid position that is neither a full State nor an ordinary Union Territory. The 69th Amendment, 1991, inserted Article 239AA, which gives the National Capital Territory a Legislative Assembly with power to make laws on matters in the State List and the Concurrent List, except public order, police and land, which are reserved to the Union. The Lieutenant Governor acts as the President's representative, and Article 239AB allows the President to suspend the Assembly's functions if the administration cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The relationship between the elected government and the Lieutenant Governor has been the subject of repeated litigation, and in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) the Supreme Court held that the Lieutenant Governor has no independent decision-making power but must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, with a narrowly defined exception for matters where he is required to act in his discretion.

Why Union Territories Exist and Why They Are Debated

Union Territories exist for reasons of strategic importance, small size, administrative convenience or a special history: island territories, a national capital and a newly reorganised region have been the usual cases. Because they are administered by the Union, critics describe them as undemocratic where they have no legislature, and argue that the residents of a Union Territory have a weaker voice than the residents of a State. The Supreme Court's judgments on Delhi, in particular, have defined the balance between the Union's special responsibility for the capital and the democratic mandate of its elected government, and these judgments remain central to any discussion of asymmetric federalism in India.

Vertical and Horizontal Devolution: The Finance Commission’s Formula in Practice

The Finance Commission (FC) determines how the divisible pool of central taxes is split between the Union and the states (vertical devolution) and how the states’ share is further distributed among them (horizontal devolution). Since the 10th FC (1995‑2000) the vertical share has risen from 29 % to 41 % under the 15th FC (2021‑2026), reflecting a deliberate policy to enlarge state fiscal space. The horizontal formula combines population (1971 census weight 15 %, 2011 census weight 10 %), area (15 %), forest cover (10 %), income distance (45 %), and demographic performance (12.5 %). The 15th FC introduced a “performance‑based” component rewarding states for GST compliance, ease‑of‑doing‑business rankings, and health‑education outcomes.

Vertical Devolution Shares (Selected Finance Commissions)
CommissionPeriodVertical Share (%)
10th1995‑200029
11th2000‑200530
12th2005‑201030
13th2010‑201532
14th2015‑202042
15th2021‑202641

The 14th FC’s jump to 42 % was later moderated to 41 % by the 15th FC after the GST subsumed several state taxes, altering the revenue base. The Commission also recommended a “grants‑in‑aid” envelope for revenue‑deficit states, local‑body grants tied to State Finance Commission (SFC) recommendations, and a disaster‑risk‑management grant. These conditional grants create a secondary lever for the Centre to influence state priorities without breaching the constitutional division of powers.

Critics argue that the income‑distance criterion, while equalising, penalises high‑growth states and may dampen competitive federalism. The 15th FC’s addition of a “demographic performance” weight attempts to reward fertility‑rate reductions, but its measurement relies on proxy indicators that can be contested. The Commission’s terms of reference (ToR) are framed by the President on the advice of the Union Cabinet; thus, the political executive can shape the devolution architecture indirectly. The 16th FC, to be constituted for 2026‑2031, will confront the post‑GST revenue stabilisation challenge and the fiscal impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on state balance sheets.

The GST Council as a Federal Bargaining Forum

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council, constituted under Article 279A, is the most consequential institutional innovation for cooperative federalism since the Inter‑State Council. It comprises the Union Finance Minister (Chairperson), the Union Minister of State for Finance, and one minister from each state, usually the state finance minister. Decisions require a three‑fourths majority of the weighted votes: the Centre holds one‑third of the total voting weight, while the states collectively hold two‑thirds. This voting structure forces consensus on rate changes, exemption lists, and compensation mechanisms.

Since its first meeting in September 2016, the Council has deliberated on over 50 rate rationalisation exercises, the transition from the origin‑based to destination‑based taxation principle, and the design of the GST compensation cess. The compensation guarantee, valid for five years (2017‑2022), was a political bargain to secure state buy‑in; its expiry triggered a new round of negotiations on revenue‑sharing formulas and the continuation of the cess. The Council’s secretariat, housed in the Department of Revenue, provides technical support but does not vote, preserving the political character of the forum.

Judicial scrutiny of Council decisions remains limited. In Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (2022) the Supreme Court held that the Council’s recommendations are not justiciable as legislative acts, but the Court can examine whether the Council acted within its constitutional mandate. The judgment underscored that the Council’s “recommendations” become binding only after the President’s assent to the corresponding GST Acts, preserving parliamentary supremacy while recognising the Council’s federal character.

The Council’s working groups on IT infrastructure (GSTN), anti‑profiteering, and sector‑specific issues (textiles, real estate) illustrate how technical coordination is embedded in a political bargaining space. States have used the Council to press for higher compensation, lower rates on essential goods, and greater autonomy in setting state‑specific cesses. The Centre, in turn, leverages its one‑third vote to block proposals that threaten fiscal consolidation. This dynamic makes the Council a live laboratory for observing how federal bargaining translates into tax policy.

Worked Answer Technique
Explain how the voting weight distribution in the GST Council reflects the principle of cooperative federalism and why the Centre’s one‑third vote is constitutionally significant.
The GST Council’s voting design gives the Centre one‑third of total voting weight and the states two‑thirds, mirroring the federal principle that taxation powers are shared but not dominated by either tier. The Centre’s one‑third vote ensures that any decision requires substantial state support, preventing unilateral central imposition of rates. At the same time, the Centre’s presence guarantees that national fiscal objectives — such as revenue stability and compliance — are represented. This weighted majority (three‑fourths) means that a coalition of states cannot override the Centre entirely, nor can the Centre act without a broad state consensus. The constitutional significance lies in Article 279A(9), which embeds this balance in the supreme law, making the Council a constitutional federal forum rather than a mere administrative committee.
Exam‑Day Strategy
When a question asks for “federal features of the GST Council”, list: (1) constitutional status under Art. 279A, (2) weighted voting with Centre one‑third, states two‑thirds, (3) three‑fourths majority for decisions, (4) binding recommendations only after Presidential assent, (5) inclusion of all states and Union Finance Minister. Memorise the voting fractions; they are frequently tested in objective papers.

State Finance Commissions and Local Government Fiscal Autonomy

Article 243I mandates that every state constitute a State Finance Commission (SFC) within one year of the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy‑Third Amendment) Act, 1992, and thereafter at intervals of five years. The SFC reviews the financial position of panchayats and municipalities, recommends the distribution of state‑net‑proceeds of taxes, duties, tolls, and fees between the state and local bodies, and suggests grants‑in‑aid from the state’s Consolidated Fund. Despite the constitutional mandate, many states have delayed SFC constitution, leading to ad‑hoc devolution and weakened local fiscal capacity.

The 14th and 15th Finance Commissions linked central local‑body grants to the timely constitution and acceptance of SFC recommendations. The 15th FC earmarked ₹90,000 crore for rural local bodies and ₹30,000 crore for urban local bodies for the 2021‑2026 period, conditional on states submitting action‑taken reports on SFC recommendations. This conditionalities framework has improved compliance: by 2023, 28 states had constituted their sixth SFC, though only 19 had implemented the full recommendation package.

SFCs typically adopt a formula combining population (70 %), area (10 %), and a “backwardness” index (20 %). Some states, such as Kerala and Karnataka, have introduced performance‑based components rewarding panchayats for own‑source‑revenue mobilisation and service‑delivery benchmarks. The SFC’s recommendations are advisory; the state legislature must pass an appropriation act to give them effect. This legislative gatekeeping sometimes results in dilution of the recommended shares, especially when state finances are stressed.

The interplay between the Union Finance Commission (vertical/horizontal devolution) and SFCs creates a two‑tier equalisation mechanism. The 15th FC’s “local‑body grants” are transferred directly to panchayats and municipalities, bypassing the state treasury, to reduce leakages. However, the grants are still routed through the state’s Public Financial Management System, and states retain discretion over the timing of release. Strengthening SFCs through statutory timelines, independent secretariats, and mandatory legislative debate on their reports remains a key reform agenda for deepening fiscal federalism at the grassroots.

Inter‑State River Water Disputes: Tribunal Mechanism and Supreme Court Oversight

The Inter‑State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (ISRWDA) provides for the constitution of ad‑hoc tribunals when riparian states fail to reach agreement through negotiations. The Centre, on the request of a state, refers the dispute to a tribunal whose decision is final and binding, subject only to a limited review by the Supreme Court under Article 136 (special leave). Since 1956, eight tribunals have been constituted — Krishna (1969), Godavari (1969), Narmada (1969), Cauvery (1990), Ravi‑Beas (1986), Vansadhara (2010), Mahadayi (2010), and Mahanadi (2018). The Cauvery tribunal’s final order (2007) and the subsequent Supreme Court judgment (2018) illustrate the layered adjudication process.

The 2002 amendment to the ISRWDA introduced a “single‑tribunal” model with a permanent chairperson and a three‑member bench, aiming to reduce delays. The amendment also mandated that the tribunal’s report be laid before Parliament, enhancing legislative oversight. Despite these reforms, tribunals often take a decade or more to deliver final awards, during which interim orders govern water sharing. The Supreme Court’s 2018 judgment in State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu upheld the Cauvery tribunal’s award but modified the monthly release schedule, exercising its power to ensure “equitable apportionment” under Article 262.

Article 262 explicitly bars the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over inter‑state water disputes, yet the Court has interpreted this bar as not precluding review of tribunal awards for constitutional violations, procedural fairness, or manifest error. This jurisprudential tension creates a de‑facto appellate layer that can both stabilise and prolong disputes. The 2020 amendment to the ISRWDA proposes a “Dispute Resolution Committee” at the basin level to attempt mediation before tribunal reference, reflecting a shift toward cooperative management.

Data‑sharing protocols under the National Water Mission and the River Basin Management Plans now feed real‑time flow data into tribunal proceedings, reducing factual disagreements. However, political resistance to data transparency persists, especially in basins with upstream‑downstream power asymmetries. The evolving framework — tribunal adjudication, Supreme Court oversight, and basin‑level mediation — embodies the constitutional design of “cooperative federalism” in a resource‑scarce context.

Judicial Doctrines Governing Legislative Competence: Pith and Substance, Colourable Legislation, and Repugnancy

When a law’s legislative competence is challenged, the Supreme Court employs three principal doctrines. The “pith and substance” test examines the true nature and character of the legislation, disregarding its incidental effects on entries outside the enacting legislature’s list. In State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951) the Court upheld a state prohibition law that incidentally affected import‑export (a Union subject) because its pith and substance fell under the State List entry “intoxicating liquors”.

The doctrine of “colourable legislation” addresses enactments that, while formally within a legislature’s competence, in substance transgress constitutional limits. The Court looks for a “colour” or disguise masking an impermissible objective. In K. C. G. Narayanan v. State of Kerala (1965) a state law imposing a tax on “professions, trades, and callings” was struck down as colourable because its real purpose was to tax income, a Union subject.

“Repugnancy” under Article 254 resolves conflicts between Union and state laws on Concurrent List subjects. If a state law is repugnant to a Union law, the Union law prevails unless the state law has received Presidential assent under Article 254(2), in which case it operates notwithstanding the repugnancy. The Supreme Court in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) clarified that repugnancy arises only when two laws cannot stand together — either because they prescribe contradictory obligations or because the Union law intends to occupy the entire field.

These doctrines interact. A state law may survive a pith‑and‑substance challenge but fall to colourable legislation if its dominant purpose is ultra vires. Conversely, a law valid under pith and substance may still be invalidated by repugnancy if a subsequent Union law occupies the field. The Court’s 2021 decision in Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (regarding the GST Council’s recommendation on compensation cess) applied repugnancy principles to hold that the Union’s GST Act prevailed over a state’s parallel cess, reinforcing the hierarchical supremacy of Union legislation on Concurrent subjects.

For aspirants, the key is to identify the list entries involved, determine the dominant purpose of the impugned statute, and then apply the appropriate doctrine. Examination questions often present a factual matrix and ask which doctrine applies; a structured answer — list entry → pith and substance → colourable legislation check → repugnancy analysis — scores full marks.

  • Confusing vertical devolution (Centre‑state split) with horizontal devolution (inter‑state distribution) in Finance Commission answers.
  • Assuming the GST Council’s recommendations are automatically binding without Presidential assent.
  • Overlooking the conditional nature of local‑body grants tied to State Finance Commission compliance.
  • Misstating that Article 262 completely bars Supreme Court review of water tribunal awards.
  • Applying the pith‑and‑substance test to Concurrent List conflicts where repugnancy is the correct doctrine.
  • Neglecting the three‑fourths weighted‑majority rule when describing GST Council decision‑making.
  • Failing to distinguish between colourable legislation (disguised ultra vires) and mere incidental encroachment covered by pith and substance.

Basic Structure Doctrine and Federalism: The S.R. Bommai and Kesavananda Jurisprudence

The basic structure doctrine, crystallised in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), holds that certain constitutional features — supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form of government, secularism, separation of powers, and federalism — cannot be amended away by Parliament under Article 368. Federalism was explicitly recognised as a basic feature in the majority opinion of Justice Khanna and later affirmed in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). In Bommai, the Supreme Court laid down stringent judicial review standards for the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356, ruling that the proclamation is subject to judicial scrutiny on grounds of mala fide, irrelevance, or constitutional impropriety. The Court held that the federal balance is a core element of the basic structure; therefore, any arbitrary dismissal of a state government undermines the constitutional scheme.

The Bommai guidelines require the Centre to place before Parliament the material on which the President’s satisfaction is based, and they mandate a floor test in the state assembly before dissolution. Subsequent judgments — Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) and Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2021) — have reinforced that the Governor’s discretion must be exercised in harmony with federal principles. In NCT of Delhi, the Court clarified that the Lieutenant Governor’s concurrence is not required on matters within the legislative competence of the Delhi Assembly, except on land, police, and public order, thereby delineating a federal space for a Union Territory with a legislature.

These rulings collectively establish a jurisprudential framework where federalism is not merely a distribution of powers but a constitutional value protected from majoritarian erosion. For aspirants, the analytical chain is: identify the constitutional provision challenged → test whether the impugned action alters the federal balance → apply the basic structure test → conclude on validity. Examination questions often present a scenario of President’s Rule or Governor’s discretion and ask whether the basic structure doctrine is attracted; a structured answer referencing Kesavananda, Bommai, and the 2021 Delhi judgment scores full marks.

Centrally Sponsored Schemes and the Flexi‑Fund Mechanism: Redefining Cooperative Federalism

Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) have been the principal instrument of Union‑state fiscal cooperation since the First Five‑Year Plan. The 14th Finance Commission (2015‑20) recommended a shift from tied grants to untied fiscal transfers, but the Union retained CSS to pursue national priorities. In 2014, the Ministry of Finance introduced the flexi‑fund mechanism, allowing states to re‑allocate up to 10 % of the allocation under each CSS to state‑specific innovations without prior Union approval. The 15th Finance Commission (2021‑26) raised this ceiling to 25 % and extended it to all CSS, subject to the condition that the re‑allocated funds remain within the broad sectoral objectives of the scheme.

The mechanism operates through an Office Memorandum (OM) issued by the Department of Expenditure. States must submit a flexi‑fund utilisation plan to the concerned line ministry, which monitors outcomes through the Public Financial Management System (PFMS). Flagship schemes such as the National Health Mission (NHM), Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), and Samagra Shiksha have seen states deploy flexi‑funds for tele‑medicine hubs, rural road maintenance, and digital classrooms respectively. However, the Union retains the power to issue scheme‑specific guidelines that may restrict flexibility, and the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) audits flexi‑fund expenditure under the same standards as core CSS funds.

Critics argue that the 25 % ceiling is still modest compared with the 14th FC’s vision of full untied devolution, and that line ministries often delay approvals, negating the intended autonomy. Proponents contend that the mechanism preserves national standards while granting states operational discretion — a practical expression of cooperative federalism. In answer writing, cite the 15th FC’s Chapter 7, the 2021 OM (F.No. 1/2021‑PFMS), and the distinction between tied and untied components of CSS.

Technique: Identify the correct constitutional provision and fiscal mechanism
A state government wants to reallocate 15 % of its Centrally Sponsored Scheme funds to a state‑specific health initiative without seeking prior Union approval. Which provision allows this and what is the current flexi‑fund ceiling?
The flexi‑fund mechanism, introduced by the Ministry of Finance OM (2014) and expanded by the 15th Finance Commission, permits states to divert up to 25 % of each CSS allocation for state‑level innovations, provided the expenditure stays within the scheme’s sectoral objectives. The constitutional basis is Article 282 (grants for public purpose) read with the Union’s power to design CSS under Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule. Since 15 % is below the 25 % ceiling, the state may proceed after submitting a utilisation plan to the concerned line ministry via PFMS; no prior Union approval is required beyond the plan submission.
Exam‑Day Strategy
When a CSS question appears, immediately note the 15th FC’s 25 % flexi‑fund ceiling and the requirement of a utilisation plan. Quote the 2021 OM number (F.No. 1/2021‑PFMS) and mention PFMS monitoring. This precision distinguishes a 7‑mark answer from a 4‑mark one.

Digital Federalism: Inter‑State Data Sharing, the National Data Governance Framework and Emerging Legal Issues

The Digital India programme and the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) (2012) laid the groundwork for open government data. In 2022, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology released the draft National Data Governance Framework Policy (NDGFP), proposing a unified architecture for data exchange across Union, state, and local bodies. The framework envisages a National Data Office to set standards, a Data Sharing Protocol for inter‑state transfers, and a Consent Management Layer aligned with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

Practical implementations already exist: the Integrated Health Information Platform (IHIP) enables real‑time disease surveillance data flow from states to the National Centre for Disease Control; the Unified District Information System for Education (UDISE+) aggregates school‑level data; and the GST Network (GSTN) shares taxpayer data between the Centre and states for compliance analytics. However, legal clarity on data ownership remains contested. Article 299 (contracts by the Government) and Article 300 (suits by or against the Government) have been invoked in disputes over data‑access agreements, while the Supreme Court’s Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) privacy judgment imposes a proportionality test on any mandatory data sharing.

Key challenges include: (1) absence of a statutory mandate for the NDGFP, leaving it as an executive policy; (2) divergent state data‑localisation laws (e.g., Meghalaya’s 2021 Data Localisation Act); (3) the lack of a uniform consent framework for citizen‑level data across states. For mains, structure answers around the constitutional entries — Union List Entry 93 (communication), State List Entry 23 (public health), Concurrent List Entry 20 (economic and social planning) — and the interplay of the IT Act, 2000, the DPDP Act, 2023, and the proposed NDGFP.

The 101st Constitutional Amendment and the Restructuring of State Taxation Powers

The 101st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016 introduced Goods and Services Tax (GST) by inserting Articles 246A, 269A, 279A and amending the Seventh Schedule. It subsumed a raft of state taxes — Value Added Tax (VAT), Central Sales Tax (CST), Entry Tax, Luxury Tax, Taxes on Advertisements, Taxes on Lotteries, Betting and Gambling, and State Cesses and Surcharges — into a single dual GST. The Amendment also created the GST Council (Article 279A) as a constitutional body with a three‑fourths weighted majority for decisions, giving the Union a de‑facto veto (one‑third vote weight).

To address revenue loss fears, the Amendment guaranteed compensation to states for five years (2017‑22) through a compensation cess on sin and luxury goods, backed by a statutory guarantee under the GST (Compensation to States) Act, 2017. The 15th Finance Commission later recommended extending the compensation mechanism in a tapered manner, but the Union discontinued the cess after June 2022, leading to litigation in State of Kerala v. Union of India (2023) where the Supreme Court upheld the Union’s discretion to cease compensation after the constitutional period.

The restructuring has two major federal implications: (1) states lost independent rate‑setting power on subsumed taxes, reducing fiscal policy space; (2) the GST Council’s recommendatory decisions become binding only after Presidential assent under Article 279A(9), a nuance often missed. Aspirants should distinguish between the legislative power (Article 246A) and the administrative coordination (GST Council), and note that the compensation guarantee was a statutory not a constitutional entitlement beyond the five‑year window.

The Inter‑State Council in Practice: Case Studies of Cauvery, Krishna and Mahadayi Disputes

Established under Article 263 by a Presidential Order in 1990, the Inter‑State Council (ISC) is a recommendatory body for coordination on inter‑state disputes and common interests. While the Council has no adjudicatory authority, its deliberations have shaped the political climate around major water disputes.

Cauvery: The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT) delivered its final award in 2007, modified by the Supreme Court in 2018 (Civil Appeal No. 2453/2018). The ISC met in 2018 and 2019 to discuss implementation of the Court’s direction for a Cauvery Management Board. The Council’s recommendation to constitute the Cauvery Water Management Authority and the Cauvery Water Regulation Committee was accepted by the Union, illustrating how ISC consensus can translate into executive action.

Krishna: The Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal (KWDT‑II) gave its report in 2010. The ISC’s 2011 meeting endorsed the Tribunal’s allocation but highlighted the need for a Krishna River Management Board. The Board was eventually notified in 2014 after prolonged negotiations, showing the Council’s role in breaking deadlocks.

Mahadayi (Mandovi): The Mahadayi Water Disputes Tribunal (MWDT) was constituted in 2010. The ISC’s 2016 session urged the parties (Goa, Karnataka, Maharashtra) to pursue mediated settlement. The Tribunal’s 2020 award allocated 13.4 tmcft to Karnataka, 24 tmcft to Goa, and 1.33 tmcft to Maharashtra. The Council’s 2021 meeting noted the award and recommended a Mahadayi River Basin Authority for implementation, which remains pending.

These cases demonstrate that the ISC functions as a political facilitator rather than a legal arbiter. Its effectiveness depends on the willingness of chief ministers to attend and compromise. In answer writing, contrast the ISC’s recommendatory nature with the binding adjudication of tribunals under Article 262, and cite the specific Council meeting years and outcomes.

  • Confusing the basic structure doctrine with parliamentary sovereignty and treating federalism as a mere statutory arrangement.
  • Assuming the flexi‑fund ceiling is uniform across all Centrally Sponsored Schemes; the 25 % limit applies scheme‑wise and is subject to line‑ministry guidelines.
  • Overlooking that the National Data Governance Framework Policy is still a draft executive policy, not an enacted law, and therefore lacks statutory enforceability.

Evolution of Horizontal Devolution Criteria: From the 10th to the 16th Finance Commission

The horizontal distribution formula has been reshaped at every Finance Commission (FC) since the 10th FC (1995‑2000). The 10th FC used three broad criteria: population (1971 Census) 25 %, area 10 %, and a composite index of fiscal capacity and fiscal discipline 65 %. The 11th FC (2000‑2005) added a tax‑effort variable (10 %) and reduced the weight of population to 20 %. The 12th FC (2005‑2010) introduced demographic change (population growth 1971‑2001) with a 10 % weight and gave 7.5 % to fiscal discipline measured by the ratio of own‑tax revenue to GSDP. The 13th FC (2010‑2015) brought forest cover (7.5 %) and a “forest‑adjusted” area factor, while retaining the 1971 population base. The 14th FC (2015‑2020) marked a structural shift: it raised the states’ share in the divisible pool to 42 % (from 32 %), adopted the 2011 Census for population (17.5 %), and assigned weights — income distance 50 %, population 17.5 %, area 15 %, forest cover 7.5 %, and demographic performance 10 %. The 15th FC (2020‑2025) kept the 42 % share, used the 2011 Census, and refined the formula to: income distance 45 %, population 15 %, area 15 %, forest and ecology 10 %, demographic performance 12.5 %, and tax effort 2.5 %. It also introduced a “performance‑based” grant window for health and education. The 16th FC (2025‑2030), whose terms of reference were notified in 2023, is mandated to consider climate‑change vulnerability, disaster‑risk exposure, and the fiscal impact of the GST compensation cessation, signalling a further evolution toward risk‑adjusted devolution.

The National Development Council, NITI Aayog and the Shift from Plan to Cooperative Federalism

The National Development Council (NDC) was constituted in August 1952 as the apex body for approving five‑year plans. Its membership comprised the Prime Minister, all Union Cabinet Ministers, Chief Ministers of all states, and administrators of Union Territories. The NDC met irregularly — only 57 times in six decades — and its resolutions were advisory, with the Planning Commission retaining the power to allocate plan outlays. In January 2015 the Government replaced the Planning Commission with the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog). The NITI Aayog’s Governing Council mirrors the NDC’s composition but adds the Lieutenant Governors of Union Territories with legislatures and the CEO of NITI Aayog as ex‑officio member‑secretary. Unlike the Planning Commission, NITI Aayog does not allocate financial resources; it formulates strategic and long‑term policy frameworks, monitors implementation through the “Aspirational Districts” programme, and facilitates “cooperative federalism” by requiring states to submit annual development plans. The first Governing Council meeting (February 2015) adopted the “Three‑Year Action Agenda” and the “Seven‑Year Strategy”. Subsequent meetings (2017, 2019, 2021, 2023) have focused on sustainable development goals, water‑security, and digital infrastructure. The shift from a top‑down plan‑allocation model to a bottom‑up, evidence‑based advisory model is the central federalism implication: states now negotiate policy priorities rather than receive earmarked plan funds.

Comparative Table Construction
Compare the composition and mandate of the National Development Council (NDC) and the NITI Aayog Governing Council.
Answer: Both bodies are chaired by the Prime Minister and include all Chief Ministers. The NDC (1952) comprised Union Cabinet Ministers, Chief Ministers, and UT administrators; its mandate was to approve five‑year plans and review plan progress. The NITI Aayog Governing Council (2015) adds the Lieutenant Governors of UTs with legislatures and the NITI Aayog CEO; its mandate is to evolve a shared national development agenda, monitor implementation of strategic frameworks, and foster cooperative federalism without allocating plan funds. A concise table captures these differences:
Exam‑Day Strategy
When a question asks about the planning architecture, highlight the transition from a resource‑allocating Planning Commission to an advisory NITI Aayog, and stress the enhanced role of states in the Governing Council. Use the comparative table format to score full marks for “compare and contrast” items.

Article 301‑307: Freedom of Inter‑State Trade, the GST Council and Emerging Jurisprudence

Articles 301 to 307 of the Constitution guarantee freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India, subject to parliamentary and state legislative powers. Article 301 declares that trade shall be free; Article 302 empowers Parliament to impose restrictions in the public interest; Article 303 prohibits discrimination between states by Parliament or state legislatures; Article 304 permits states to impose reasonable restrictions on goods imported from other states, provided they do not discriminate; Article 305 saves existing laws and laws providing for state monopolies; Article 306 (repealed) dealt with restrictions on inter‑state trade; Article 307 authorises Parliament to appoint an authority for carrying out the provisions of Articles 301‑304. The 101st Constitutional Amendment (2016) inserted Article 279A creating the GST Council, which recommends rates, exemptions, and threshold limits for the Goods and Services Tax. The Council’s decisions, though recommendatory, acquire binding force after Presidential assent under Article 279A(9). Judicial interpretation has clarified the interplay: in State of Karnataka v. Union of India (2020) the Supreme Court held that the GST compensation cess is a statutory, not constitutional, entitlement beyond the five‑year period. In M/s. Jindal Stainless Ltd v. State of Haryana (2021) the Court struck down a state entry tax on goods already subsumed under GST, affirming that Article 304(b) cannot be used to re‑impose taxes on GST‑subsumed items. The emerging jurisprudence underscores that the GST Council functions as a federal bargaining forum where the Union’s one‑third vote weight gives it a de‑facto veto, while states retain limited fiscal space through the compensation mechanism and the power to levy taxes on items outside GST (e.g., petroleum, alcohol).

Performance‑Based Grants and the 15th Finance Commission’s Health and Education Conditionalities

The 15th Finance Commission (2020‑2025) introduced a performance‑based grant window amounting to ₹1.5 lakh crore for health and ₹1.2 lakh crore for education over the award period 2021‑26. For health, grants are linked to the National Health Mission (NHM) indicators: outpatient‑department attendance, institutional delivery rate, immunisation coverage, and the functional status of Health and Wellness Centres. States must submit quarterly progress reports through the NHM portal; the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare certifies compliance before the Ministry of Finance releases instalments. For education, the Samagra Shiksha scheme provides the framework: grants are conditional on achieving targets for gross enrolment ratio at secondary level, transition rate from primary to upper primary, learning‑outcome assessments (NAS), and the proportion of schools with functional electricity, drinking water, and toilets. The Commission stipulated that 60 % of the health grant and 50 % of the education grant be released as “unconditional” base allocations, with the remainder contingent on meeting the performance benchmarks. The first tranche (2021‑22) saw 22 states qualify for the full health performance component, while 18 states met the education thresholds. The conditionalities aim to address the historic “fly‑paper effect” where untied grants did not translate into improved outcomes, but they have also raised concerns about administrative burden and the reliability of state‑reported data.

Disaster Management Federalism: The National Disaster Management Authority, State Disaster Response Funds and the Role of the Union

The Disaster Management Act, 2005 created a three‑tier institutional architecture: the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) chaired by the Prime Minister, State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMAs) headed by Chief Ministers, and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs). Financing follows a shared pattern: the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and State Disaster Response Funds (SDRFs) are funded through a 75:25 centre‑state contribution for general category states and 90:10 for special category states (including the North‑Eastern and hill states). The 15th Finance Commission recommended an enhanced allocation of ₹1.6 lakh crore to NDRF and ₹0.9 lakh crore to SDRFs for 2021‑26. In practice, the Union supplements SDRFs through “additional central assistance” when a disaster is declared “of severe nature” under Section 48 of the Act. Recent episodes illustrate the federal dynamics: the 2021 Uttarakhand flash floods triggered a central release of ₹1,200 crore from NDRF within 48 hours; the 2023 Odisha cyclone (Cyclone Mocha) saw the Union deploy NDRF battalions and release ₹2,500 crore as immediate relief; the COVID‑19 pandemic was notified as a “disaster” under the Act, enabling the Union to invoke the NDRF for health‑infrastructure augmentation and to coordinate vaccine procurement across states. The Act also empowers the NDMA to issue binding guidelines on preparedness, mitigation, and capacity‑building, which states must incorporate into their State Disaster Management Plans. The evolving jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court’s 2022 direction in State of Kerala v. Union of India on timely release of SDRF instalments, reinforces the principle that disaster response is a shared constitutional obligation, not a discretionary central largesse.

  • Confusing the 14th FC’s 42 % vertical share with the horizontal formula weights; the vertical share determines the size of the divisible pool, while horizontal weights decide inter‑state distribution.
  • Treating NITI Aayog as a financial allocator; it has no power to disburse plan funds, unlike the erstwhile Planning Commission.
  • Assuming Article 304 allows states to levy any tax on inter‑state goods; the provision only permits non‑discriminatory restrictions on goods not subsumed under GST.
  • Overlooking that performance‑based grants under the 15th FC are partially unconditional; the base allocation is released irrespective of outcomes.
  • Believing the NDMA can directly spend SDRF money; the NDMA sets guidelines, but SDRF expenditures are executed by state governments.
  • Remember to verify the latest Finance Commission report before the exam.

Practice Questions

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