Polity & Constitution
Learning Objectives
- Understand the fundamental concepts of Polity & Constitution
- Apply key formulas and techniques to solve problems
- Practice with exam-level questions to build speed and accuracy
1. Constitutional Framework and Historical Evolution
1.1 The Making of the Constitution
The Constitution of India emerged from a prolonged process of deliberation that began with the demand for a sovereign constituent assembly during the freedom struggle and culminated in the adoption of the document on 26 November 1949. The Constituent Assembly, composed of representatives elected by provincial legislatures, met for the first time on 9 December 1946 and functioned through eleven sessions spread over almost three years. Its debates reflected a synthesis of indigenous political thought, British parliamentary practice, and the constitutional experiences of the United States, Canada, and Ireland. The drafting committee, chaired by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, prepared the final text after incorporating more than two thousand amendments moved by members. The Assembly’s decision to adopt a written, rigid constitution with a preamble declaring India a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic set the normative foundation for the entire legal order. The historical context of partition, communal violence, and the integration of princely states compelled the framers to embed strong centralising features while simultaneously guaranteeing fundamental rights to protect minorities.
1.2 The Preamble and Its Significance
The Preamble serves as the philosophical key to the Constitution, encapsulating the objectives of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity. It declares the source of authority as the people of India, thereby establishing popular sovereignty as the bedrock of the polity. The words “socialist” and “secular” were inserted by the Forty‑second Amendment in 1976, reflecting the evolving ideological orientation of the state. Courts have repeatedly held that the Preamble is not merely a decorative preface but an interpretive aid; in the Kesavananda Bharati case the Supreme Court ruled that the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be altered even by a constitutional amendment, and the Preamble’s ideals form part of that basic structure. Consequently, any legislative or executive action that undermines the declared objectives can be struck down as unconstitutional. The Preamble also guides the interpretation of fundamental rights and directive principles, ensuring that the Constitution remains a living document responsive to the aspirations of the citizenry.
1.3 Salient Features of the Constitution
The Indian Constitution is distinguished by its length, detail, and blend of rigidity and flexibility. It contains 395 articles in 22 parts and 12 schedules, making it one of the longest written constitutions in the world. The document establishes a parliamentary system of government at both the centre and the states, with a ceremonial President and a real executive headed by the Prime Minister. Federalism is enshrined through a clear division of legislative powers in the Seventh Schedule, yet the centre possesses overriding authority in matters of national importance, emergency provisions, and the power to reorganise states. The Constitution guarantees six categories of fundamental rights, enforceable by the judiciary, and enumerates directive principles that, while non‑justiciable, direct state policy. An independent judiciary with the power of judicial review, a comprehensive amendment procedure under Article 368, and provisions for emergency rule further characterize the framework. These features collectively create a system that balances unity with diversity, stability with adaptability.
1.4 The Doctrine of Basic Structure
The basic structure doctrine, articulated in the landmark Kesavananda Bharati judgment of 1973, limits the amending power of Parliament by declaring that certain core features of the Constitution cannot be altered. The Supreme Court identified elements such as the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, secularism, separation of powers, federalism, and the rule of law as constituting the basic structure. Subsequent cases, including Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) and Minerva Mills (1980), refined the doctrine by adding judicial review and the balance between fundamental rights and directive principles. The doctrine operates as a constitutional safeguard against majoritarian excesses, ensuring that amendments do not destroy the identity of the Constitution. It also empowers the judiciary to review constitutional amendments, a power that has been exercised sparingly but decisively. The basic structure doctrine thus functions as a constitutional “immune system,” preserving the foundational values against transient political pressures.
| Aspect | Fundamental Rights | Directive Principles |
|---|---|---|
| Justiciability | Enforceable by courts under Article 32 and 226 | Non‑justiciable; serve as guidelines for legislation |
| Nature | Negative obligations on the state (prohibitions) | Positive obligations (directions for policy) |
| Amendment | Can be amended but not abrogated if part of basic structure | Can be amended freely; no basic structure protection |
| Examples | Right to equality (Art. 14), freedom of speech (Art. 19) | Uniform civil code (Art. 44), promotion of cottage industries (Art. 43) |
2. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
2.1 Classification of Fundamental Rights
The Constitution groups fundamental rights into six categories: right to equality (Articles 14‑18), right to freedom (Articles 19‑22), right against exploitation (Articles 23‑24), right to freedom of religion (Articles 25‑28), cultural and educational rights (Articles 29‑30), and right to constitutional remedies (Article 32). Each category addresses a distinct dimension of individual liberty and collective dignity. The right to equality prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth and empowers the state to make special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes. The right to freedom guarantees six freedoms, including speech, assembly, association, movement, residence, and profession, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in the interest of sovereignty, public order, and morality. The right against exploitation abolishes traffic in human beings, forced labour, and child labour in hazardous occupations. Freedom of religion protects the conscience of individuals and the autonomy of religious denominations. Cultural and educational rights safeguard the interests of minorities to conserve language, script, and culture and to establish educational institutions. Finally, the right to constitutional remedies empowers the Supreme Court and High Courts to issue writs for the enforcement of all other fundamental rights, making the judiciary the ultimate guardian of the charter.
2.2 Judicial Review and Landmark Cases
Judicial review is the mechanism through which courts examine the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. The power derives implicitly from Article 13, which declares that any law inconsistent with fundamental rights shall be void, and explicitly from Article 32 and 226, which confer writ jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and High Courts. In A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Court initially adopted a narrow, literal interpretation of “procedure established by law,” but this was overturned in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), where the Court held that the procedure must be fair, just, and reasonable, thereby importing due‑process principles into Article 21. The Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) established the basic structure doctrine, limiting Parliament’s amending power. In S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Court laid down guidelines for the imposition of President’s rule under Article 356, reinforcing federalism. More recently, the Navtej Singh Johar judgment (2018) decriminalised consensual same‑sex relations, expanding the scope of dignity and privacy under Article 21. These cases illustrate how judicial review dynamically shapes the contours of fundamental rights in response to evolving societal values.
2.3 Directive Principles of State Policy
Part IV of the Constitution (Articles 36‑51) contains the Directive Principles of State Policy, which embody the socio‑economic aspirations of the framers. Unlike fundamental rights, these principles are not enforceable by any court, yet Article 37 declares them fundamental in the governance of the country and obliges the state to apply them in making laws. They are classified into three broad groups: social and economic principles (e.g., adequate means of livelihood, equal pay for equal work, right to work, education, and public assistance), Gandhian principles (e.g., promotion of cottage industries, prohibition of intoxicating drinks, organisation of village panchayats), and liberal‑intellectual principles (e.g., uniform civil code, separation of judiciary from executive, promotion of international peace). The principles have guided landmark legislation such as the Minimum Wages Act, the Right to Education Act, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Although non‑justiciable, courts have occasionally read them into fundamental rights to expand the scope of Article 21, as seen in the Unni Krishnan case (1993) where the right to education was derived from the directive principle in Article 41.
2.4 Relationship Between Rights and Principles
The interplay between fundamental rights and directive principles has been a central theme in constitutional jurisprudence. Initially, the Supreme Court in the Champakam Dorairajan case (1951) held that directive principles cannot override fundamental rights. However, the Twenty‑fifth Amendment (1971) inserted Article 31C, giving primacy to laws implementing certain directive principles over Articles 14 and 19. The Kesavananda Bharati judgment upheld this amendment only to the extent that it did not damage the basic structure. In Minerva Mills (1980), the Court struck down the clause that gave blanket precedence to all directive principles, reaffirming that a harmonious construction must be sought. The current position is that fundamental rights and directive principles are complementary; the state must strive to achieve the goals of the directives while respecting the inviolable core of fundamental rights. This balance ensures that socio‑economic reforms do not come at the cost of civil liberties, and that the Constitution remains a charter of both liberty and justice.
3. Union Executive and Legislature
3.1 The President and the Council of Ministers
The President of India is the constitutional head of the Union, elected by an electoral college consisting of elected members of both Houses of Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies of the States. Although the President exercises formal executive power, the real executive authority rests with the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister, as mandated by Article 74. The President acts on the aid and advice of the Council, which is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. The President’s discretionary powers are limited to situations such as the appointment of the Prime Minister when no party commands a clear majority, the dissolution of the Lok Sabha on the advice of a defeated government, and the referral of bills for reconsideration. The President also possesses veto powers: absolute veto over money bills (which cannot be returned), suspensive veto over ordinary bills, and pocket veto by simply withholding assent indefinitely. The office thus embodies a ceremonial symbol of unity while the parliamentary executive ensures democratic accountability.
3.2 Parliament: Composition and Powers
Parliament consists of the President and two Houses: the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and the House of the People (Lok Sabha). The Rajya Sabha represents the states and union territories, with members elected by the legislative assemblies of the states through proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote. The Lok Sabha is directly elected by adult suffrage from territorial constituencies. Parliament’s legislative powers extend to all subjects in the Union List and the Concurrent List, and, under certain circumstances, to the State List. It controls the executive through questions, motions, and committees, and holds the power of the purse by approving the annual budget and supplementary grants. The Parliament also has constituent functions, including the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, and judicial functions such as the impeachment of the President and removal of judges. Its role as a forum for national debate makes it the central institution of representative democracy.
3.3 Legislative Process and Money Bills
A bill may originate in either House, except a Money Bill which can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha on the recommendation of the President. After passage by one House, the bill is transmitted to the other House, which may pass, reject, or amend it. In case of disagreement, a joint sitting may be summoned by the President under Article 108, except for Money Bills and Constitution Amendment Bills. A Money Bill, defined in Article 110, deals exclusively with taxation, borrowing, expenditure from the Consolidated Fund, and related financial matters. The Rajya Sabha cannot amend a Money Bill; it may only make recommendations, which the Lok Sabha may accept or reject. The Speaker of the Lok Sabha certifies whether a bill is a Money Bill, and this certification is final. The President’s assent is required for all bills, but for Money Bills the President cannot withhold assent. This procedure ensures that the directly elected House retains primacy over financial legislation, reflecting the principle of fiscal accountability.
3.4 Parliamentary Committees and Accountability
Parliamentary committees are the engine of detailed scrutiny, enabling Parliament to examine legislation, expenditure, and administration beyond the constraints of floor debates. Standing committees such as the Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee, and the Committee on Public Undertakings examine government accounts and audit reports, ensuring financial accountability. Department‑related standing committees, reconstituted annually, scrutinise the demands for grants, bills, and policy documents of specific ministries. Ad hoc committees are constituted for specific inquiries, such as the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the 2G spectrum allocation. Committee reports, though not binding, carry significant moral and political weight; the government is expected to respond to recommendations. The committee system also provides a platform for opposition members to influence policy, thereby strengthening the checks‑and‑balances architecture of the parliamentary system.
| Feature | Union List (List I) | State List (List II) |
|---|---|---|
| Number of Subjects | 97 subjects | 66 subjects |
| Examples | Defence, foreign affairs, atomic energy, currency | Police, public health, agriculture, local government |
| Legislative Authority | Exclusive to Parliament | Exclusive to State Legislature |
| Override Provision | Parliament can legislate on State List under Articles 249, 250, 252, 253 | State law prevails only if not repugnant to Union law on Concurrent List |
4. State Executive and Legislature
4.1 The Governor and the State Council of Ministers
The Governor is the constitutional head of a state, appointed by the President on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers. The Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President and acts as the representative of the centre in the state. Executive power of the state is vested in the Governor, but it is exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister, mirroring the Union pattern. The Governor’s discretionary powers include the appointment of the Chief Minister when no party has a clear majority, the power to reserve certain bills for the President’s consideration, and the authority to report to the President on the failure of constitutional machinery under Article 356. The Governor also summons, prorogues, and dissolves the state legislature. While the office is intended to be a neutral constitutional authority, political controversies have arisen over the use of discretionary powers, prompting judicial guidelines in cases such as S. R. Bommai to prevent misuse.
4.2 State Legislature: Structure and Functions
Most states have a unicameral legislature consisting of the Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha), while a few possess a bicameral structure with a Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad) in addition to the Assembly. Members of the Assembly are directly elected from territorial constituencies, whereas Council members are elected by local bodies, graduates, teachers, and members of the Assembly, with some nominated by the Governor. The state legislature exercises legislative power over subjects in the State List and the Concurrent List, subject to the supremacy of Union law in case of conflict. It controls the state executive through questions, motions, and the passage of the budget. The Assembly alone can pass Money Bills, and the Council can only delay non‑Money Bills for a maximum of three months. The legislature also participates in the amendment of the Constitution by ratifying certain amendments under Article 368.
4.3 Centre‑State Legislative Relations
The distribution of legislative powers is governed by the Seventh Schedule, which delineates the Union List, State List, and Concurrent List. Parliament has exclusive authority over the Union List, while state legislatures have exclusive authority over the State List. Both can legislate on Concurrent List subjects, but in case of repugnancy, the Union law prevails unless the state law has been reserved for the President’s assent and received it. Parliament can also legislate on State List subjects under five extraordinary circumstances: national interest (Article 249), emergency (Article 250), request by two or more states (Article 252), implementation of international treaties (Article 253), and President’s rule (Article 356). These provisions create a strong centre, justified by the need for national integrity, economic unity, and effective implementation of international obligations. The Sarkaria Commission and the Punchhi Commission have recommended safeguards to prevent excessive centralisation, emphasizing consultation and cooperative federalism.
4.4 Administrative Relations and All India Services
Administrative relations between the centre and the states are structured to ensure compliance with Union laws while preserving state autonomy in day‑to‑day governance. The Union can issue directions to states under Articles 256 and 257 for the implementation of Union laws and for the maintenance of means of communication and railway protection. The All India Services — Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service, and Indian Forest Service — are recruited and trained by the Union but serve under state governments, providing a cadre of officers with a national perspective. The Union also controls the appointment and transfer of High Court judges, the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the Election Commission, reinforcing institutional uniformity. The Inter‑State Council, established under Article 263, serves as a forum for discussion of common interests, though its recommendations are advisory. These mechanisms aim to balance the need for a cohesive administrative framework with the federal principle of state self‑governance.
5. Federalism, Distribution of Powers and Amendments
5.1 Distribution of Legislative Powers: Union, State and Concurrent Lists
The Seventh Schedule is the constitutional blueprint for legislative federalism. The Union List contains 97 entries covering subjects of national importance such as defence, foreign affairs, atomic energy, citizenship, and interstate trade. The State List comprises 66 entries dealing with local matters like police, public health, agriculture, and local government. The Concurrent List includes 47 entries where both Parliament and state legislatures may legislate, including criminal law, marriage, bankruptcy, and economic planning. In the event of a conflict between a Union law and a state law on a Concurrent subject, the Union law prevails under Article 254, unless the state law has been reserved for the President’s assent and received it. The residuary power of legislation, covering any subject not enumerated in the three lists, vests in Parliament under Article 248. This distribution reflects a quasi‑federal design: a strong centre with sufficient flexibility for states to address regional needs, while the Concurrent List enables cooperative legislation on matters of common concern.
5.2 Financial Relations and the Finance Commission
Financial federalism is mediated through the distribution of tax revenues and grants‑in‑aid. The Constitution divides taxing powers: the Union levies taxes on income (except agricultural income), customs, excise on goods manufactured or produced, and corporation tax; states levy taxes on land, agricultural income, sales tax (now subsumed under GST), and state excise. The Goods and Services Tax (GST), introduced by the One Hundred and First Amendment in 2016, created a unified indirect tax regime with a dual structure — Central GST and State GST — and an Integrated GST for inter‑state supplies. The Finance Commission, constituted every five years under Article 280, recommends the vertical share of Union taxes to states and the horizontal distribution among states based on criteria such as population, area, fiscal capacity, and fiscal discipline. The Fifteenth Finance Commission (2020‑25) recommended a 41% vertical devolution and introduced performance‑based incentives. Grants‑in‑aid under Article 275 supplement the resources of states with special needs. This architecture seeks to balance equity, efficiency, and autonomy in fiscal matters.
5.3 Constitutional Amendments: Procedure and Major Amendments
Article 368 prescribes the procedure for amending the Constitution. An amendment bill must be passed by a special majority — a majority of the total membership of each House and a two‑thirds majority of members present and voting — in both Houses of Parliament. Certain amendments affecting the federal structure, such as changes to the representation of states in Parliament, the extent of executive power, or the provisions of the Seventh Schedule, additionally require ratification by at least half of the state legislatures. The Constitution has been amended 105 times as of 2023. Major amendments include the First Amendment (1951) placing reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech, the Twenty‑fourth Amendment (1971) affirming Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, the Forty‑second Amendment (1976) — known as the “Mini‑Constitution” — which altered the Preamble, curtailed judicial review, and extended the term of Lok Sabha, and the Forty‑fourth Amendment (1978) which restored many pre‑Emergency provisions. The Seventy‑third and Seventy‑fourth Amendments (1992) constitutionalised Panchayati Raj institutions and urban local bodies. The One Hundred and First Amendment (2016) introduced GST. Each amendment reflects the evolving political consensus and the tension between flexibility and the preservation of the basic structure.
5.4 Emerging Issues in Federal Balance
Contemporary federal dynamics are shaped by several emerging issues. The implementation of GST has altered the fiscal autonomy of states, prompting demands for a larger share of the GST compensation cess and greater representation in the GST Council. The use of Article 356 for President’s rule has declined after the S. R. Bommai guidelines, but political pressures persist in states with fractured mandates. The creation of new states, such as Telangana in 2014, raises questions about the criteria for reorganisation and the impact on administrative efficiency. The National Education Policy 2020 and the proposed National Medical Commission illustrate the centre’s increasing role in sectors traditionally under state control, justified by the Concurrent List. The Inter‑State Water Disputes Act and the River Boards Act highlight the need for cooperative mechanisms to manage shared natural resources. Finally, the debate over a uniform civil code under Article 44 intersects with personal law, a state subject, testing the limits of legislative competence. These issues underscore that federalism in India is a living negotiation rather than a static division of powers.
The Constitution thus provides a comprehensive framework that balances unity with diversity, rigidity with flexibility, and central authority with regional autonomy, enabling the world’s largest democracy to adapt while preserving its foundational values.
Standards of Judicial Review: Wednesbury, Proportionality and Legitimate Expectation
Indian courts have moved beyond the traditional Wednesbury unreasonableness test imported from English administrative law. The Supreme Court in Om Kumar v. Union of India (2000) held that the Wednesbury standard — whether a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it — is insufficient for reviewing executive action that affects fundamental rights. Instead, the Court adopted a proportionality analysis requiring that the measure be suitable, necessary and balanced in its impact on the right concerned. This three‑limbed test was refined in K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) where the Court linked proportionality to the reasonableness requirement under Article 14 and the due process dimension of Article 21.
A parallel doctrine, legitimate expectation, protects individuals who have been led by a consistent administrative practice or an explicit promise to expect a particular benefit. In State of Punjab v. Ram Singh (1992) the Court ruled that a legitimate expectation arises when a public authority makes a clear representation, the claimant relies on it, and it would be unfair to frustrate that reliance. The doctrine does not create a substantive right but imposes a procedural fairness obligation: the authority must hear the affected person before withdrawing the benefit.
The hierarchy of review standards can be summarised as follows:
| Standard | Origin | Applicability | Key Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wednesbury unreasonableness | English law (Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp., 1948) | Purely discretionary executive decisions not touching fundamental rights | State of U.P. v. Rajesh Gautam (2002) |
| Proportionality | European Court of Human Rights; adopted in India | Decisions affecting fundamental rights, especially Articles 14, 19, 21 | Om Kumar (2000); Puttaswamy (2017) |
| Legitimate expectation | English law (Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985) | Withdrawal of benefits or privileges based on prior representation or practice | Ram Singh (1992); Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (1993) |
In practice, the Court often blends these standards. For instance, in Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) the Court applied proportionality to a service matter while also recognising a legitimate expectation arising from a long‑standing promotion policy. The trend signals a shift from a deferential “no‑review” posture to a structured, rights‑centric scrutiny that aligns with the constitutional guarantee of judicial review under Articles 32 and 226.
Emergency Provisions: National Emergency, State Emergency and Financial Emergency
The Constitution envisages three distinct emergency regimes, each with its own triggering conditions, parliamentary safeguards and judicial oversight mechanisms.
National Emergency (Article 352)
A proclamation of national emergency can be issued only on the grounds of war, external aggression or armed rebellion. The President must act on the written advice of the Union Cabinet. The proclamation must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within one month by a special majority (majority of total membership and two‑thirds of members present and voting). Once approved, it remains in force for six months and can be extended indefinitely with repeated parliamentary approvals every six months. During a national emergency, the Centre acquires the power to legislate on State List subjects (Article 250), the life of the Lok Sabha can be extended by one year at a time (Article 83), and fundamental rights under Article 19 are automatically suspended (Article 358). The Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) held that the proclamation is subject to judicial review on the ground of mala fides or irrelevance, but the Court refrains from reviewing the subjective satisfaction of the President.
State Emergency / President’s Rule (Article 356)
President’s Rule may be imposed when the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor or otherwise, is satisfied that the government of a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The proclamation must be approved by Parliament within two months by a simple majority. It remains in force for six months and can be extended up to a maximum of three years, provided that after the first year the extension requires a certification by the Election Commission that elections cannot be held. The landmark S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgment laid down stringent guidelines: the proclamation is justiciable; the material on which the President acted must be placed before Parliament; the State Legislative Assembly cannot be dissolved before parliamentary approval; and secularism being a basic feature, a government pursuing anti‑secular policies can be dismissed. The Court also held that the imposition of President’s Rule for political reasons constitutes a fraud on the Constitution.
Financial Emergency (Article 360)
A financial emergency can be proclaimed if the President is satisfied that the financial stability or credit of India or any part thereof is threatened. It must be approved by Parliament within two months by a simple majority. During its operation, the Union can direct states to observe canons of financial propriety, reduce salaries of all or any class of persons serving in the state, and require all money bills to be reserved for the President’s consideration. To date, Article 360 has never been invoked.
Cooperative Federalism in Practice: Inter‑State Council, Zonal Councils and the GST Council
Beyond the formal distribution of legislative and financial powers, the Constitution provides institutional mechanisms for routine Centre‑State dialogue. Article 263 empowers the President to establish an Inter‑State Council to inquire into and advise upon disputes between states, investigate subjects of common interest, and make recommendations for better coordination. The Council, chaired by the Prime Minister and comprising Chief Ministers of all states and Union Territories with legislatures, plus six Union Cabinet Ministers, meets periodically; its recommendations are advisory but carry political weight. The Zonal Councils, created under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, group states into five zones (Northern, Central, Eastern, Western, Southern) to foster regional cooperation on issues such as law and order, water sharing, and infrastructure. Each Zonal Council is chaired by the Union Home Minister and includes the Chief Ministers of the constituent states.
The Goods and Services Tax Council (Article 279A), introduced by the 101st Amendment, is the most consequential cooperative body in recent times. It comprises the Union Finance Minister (Chair), the Union Minister of State for Finance, and the Finance Ministers of all states. Decisions are taken by a three‑fourths weighted majority, with the Centre holding one‑third of the vote and states collectively two‑thirds. The Council determines tax rates, exemptions, threshold limits, and the model GST law. Its consensus‑based functioning has been tested by disputes over compensation cess, rate rationalisation, and the inclusion of petroleum products. The Fifteenth Finance Commission’s recommendation to link a portion of vertical devolution to GST performance further intertwines fiscal federalism with cooperative decision‑making.
These bodies illustrate a shift from “competitive federalism” — where states vie for central resources — to “cooperative federalism” where institutionalised negotiation replaces ad‑hoc bargaining. However, the effectiveness of the Inter‑State Council has been limited by irregular meetings (only 12 meetings since 1990) and the non‑binding nature of its advice. The Zonal Councils, while more frequent, often focus on law‑and‑order rather than developmental issues. The GST Council, by contrast, meets monthly and its decisions have direct revenue impact, making it the most operational forum for federal bargaining today.
Independent Constitutional Bodies: Appointment, Tenure, Removal and Functional Autonomy
The Constitution insulates several key institutions from executive interference through specific appointment procedures, fixed tenures, and removal processes that require parliamentary super‑majorities or judicial inquiry.
Election Commission (Article 324)
The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister‑led Council of Ministers. Since the 2023 amendment to the Election Commission (Conditions of Service) Act, the CEC and Commissioners hold office for a term of six years or until the age of 65, whichever is earlier. Removal of the CEC requires a motion passed by both Houses of Parliament by a special majority on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity — the same standard as a Supreme Court judge. The other Commissioners can be removed only on the recommendation of the CEC.
Comptroller and Auditor General (Article 148)
The CAG is appointed by the President for a term of six years or until age 65. The CAG can be removed only by an address of both Houses of Parliament supported by a special majority on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The CAG’s reports are laid before Parliament and state legislatures, ensuring legislative oversight of executive expenditure.
Union Public Service Commission (Article 315)
The Chairman and members of the UPSC are appointed by the President. They hold office for a term of six years or until age 62. Removal follows the same special‑majority parliamentary address procedure as the CAG. The UPSC’s recommendations on recruitment, promotions and disciplinary matters are advisory but the government is constitutionally bound to consult it.
National Commissions for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes (Articles 338, 338A, 338B)
Each Commission consists of a Chairperson, Vice‑Chairperson and three other members appointed by the President. They serve for a term of three years. Removal requires a presidential order after a Supreme Court inquiry on grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity. These Commissions investigate safeguards, monitor implementation of protective legislation, and advise on policy formulation.
Functional autonomy is reinforced by budgetary independence: the expenses of the Election Commission, CAG and UPSC are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, not subject to annual parliamentary voting. Nevertheless, concerns persist about the executive’s influence in appointments, especially for the Election Commission, where the lack of a collegium‑style selection mechanism has been flagged by the Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) as a potential threat to institutional independence.
Parliamentary Privileges, Contempt of Parliament and Judicial Oversight
Articles 105 (for Parliament) and 194 (for State Legislatures) confer two broad categories of privileges: freedom of speech in the House and immunity from legal proceedings for anything said or any vote cast; and immunity from arrest in civil cases during the session and 40 days before and after it. The Houses also possess the power to punish for contempt — any act that obstructs or impedes the performance of their functions — which includes publishing false reports of proceedings, assaulting members, or refusing to attend as a witness.
The scope of these privileges is not codified; they are derived from the powers of the British House of Commons as they stood on 26 January 1950, subject to constitutional limitations. The Supreme Court in Keshav Singh v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly (1965) held that the judiciary can examine whether a privilege claimed by the House exists under Article 105, but cannot review the House’s internal disciplinary decisions. In Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) the Court asserted that parliamentary privilege is subject to fundamental rights; a member’s expulsion for “cash‑for‑questions” was upheld because the House’s power to expel is a part of its privilege, yet the Court retained the authority to test the procedural fairness of the expulsion.
Key distinctions:
- Privilege vs. Contempt: Privilege is a right or immunity enjoyed by members; contempt is an offence against the authority of the House.
- Judicial Review: Courts may determine the existence and extent of a privilege (justiciability) but generally refrain from reviewing the merits of a contempt punishment.
- Codification: The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 and the Rules of Procedure provide procedural frameworks, but a comprehensive codification has been repeatedly recommended (e.g., by the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission) and remains pending.
These principles ensure that legislatures can function without external intimidation while preventing the misuse of privilege to shield corruption or suppress dissent.
- Confusing the special‑majority requirement for national emergency (Art. 352) with the simple majority for President’s Rule (Art. 356).
- Assuming the GST Council’s decisions require unanimity; the Constitution mandates a three‑fourths weighted majority.
- Treating the Election Commission’s removal procedure as identical to that of the CAG; the CEC needs a special‑majority address, while other Commissioners are removed on the CEC’s recommendation.
- Believing that legitimate expectation creates a substantive right enforceable as a fundamental right; it only imposes a procedural fairness duty.
- Thinking that parliamentary privilege is absolute; the Supreme Court has held it subject to fundamental rights and justiciable on the question of existence.
- Overlooking that the Inter‑State Council’s recommendations are advisory and not binding on the Centre or states.
- Misstating that Financial Emergency (Art. 360) has been invoked; it has never been proclaimed since the Constitution came into force.