Module 2 · CLAT Current Affairs & GK

Legal General Knowledge

Updated 17 Nov 2026 · 3,319 words · illustrated
Updated 21 Nov 2026
Important legal terms, landmark cases, constitutional amendments, legal bodies.
Legal Terms · Landmark Cases · Amendments · Legal Bodies
🎯 Take Mock Test
Internal Waters —Full SovereigntyTerritorial Sea (12nm) — Sovereignty +Innocent PassageContiguous Zone (24nm) — Customs,Fiscal, Immigration, Sanitary ControlExclusive EconomicZone (200 nm) —Sovereign Rights over ResourcesContinental Shelf(200–350 nm) —Seabed / Subsoil RightsBaseline / CoastlineHigh Seas — Freedom of Navigation, Overflight, Fishing, ResearchArt. 2, 3, 33, 55, 76 UNCLOSIndia: 12 nm TS, 24 nm CZ, 200 nm EEZ (Act 1976, 1981, 2002)vlymbooq
Maritime Zones Under UNCLOS - Legal Geography — Shows the layered maritime zones from baseline to high seas with legal rights and breadths under UNCLOS. · Open the full diagram →
Internal Waters – Full SovereigntyTerritorial Sea (12 nm) – Sovereignty + Innocent PassageContiguous Zone (24 nm) – Customs, Fiscal, Immigration, SanitationEEZ (200 nm) – Sovereign Rights: Resources, JurisdictionContinental Shelf (200–350 nm) – Seabed/Subsoil RightsHigh Seas – Freedom of Navigation, Overflight, FishingThe Area (Seabed Beyond) – Common Heritage of MankindUNCLOS 1982: Arts 3, 33, 57, 76, 87, 136India: Territorial Waters Act 1976, Maritime Zones Act 1976/1981vlymbooq
Maritime Zones Under UNCLOS & Indian Law — Shows legal maritime zones from baseline to high seas with sovereign rights at each band. · Open the full diagram →

Learning Objectives

  • Understand the fundamental concepts of Legal General Knowledge
  • Apply key formulas and techniques to solve problems
  • Practice with exam-level questions to build speed and accuracy

Legal General Knowledge for CLAT

Legal GK covers important legal terms, landmark cases, constitutional amendments, and legal bodies. Questions test familiarity with the Indian legal system — no deep legal expertise needed, just awareness of landmark developments.

  • Important legal terms:
    • Writ: Formal written order issued by a court (habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto).
    • PIL: Public Interest Litigation — petition by public-spirited person for enforcement of others' rights.
    • Ultra vires: Beyond one's legal power/authority.
    • Habeas corpus: 'You shall have the body' — produces a detained person before court.
    • Mandamus: 'We command' — directs a public official to perform duty.
    • Prohibition: Stops a lower court from exceeding jurisdiction.
    • Certiorari: Transfers a case to a higher court for review.
    • Quo warranto: 'By what authority' — challenges a person's right to hold public office.
    • Locus standi: Right/standing to bring a case before court.
    • Bona fide: In good faith.
    • Malafide: In bad faith.
    • Audi alteram partem: Hear the other side — principle of natural justice.
    • Nemo judex in causa sua: No one should be a judge in their own case.
    • Res judicata: Matter already judged — cannot be re-litigated.
    • Stare decisis: Precedent — courts follow earlier decisions.
    • Ratio decidendi: Reason for decision (binding part of precedent).
    • Obiter dictum: Remark made in passing (not binding).
    • Mens rea: Guilty mind — mental element of crime.
    • Actus reus: Guilty act.
    • Caveat emptor: Let the buyer beware.
    • Injunction: Court order requiring someone to do/not do something.
    • Affidavit: Sworn written statement.
    • Plaintiff/Defendant: Person suing / person being sued.
    • Appellant/Respondent: Person appealing / person responding to appeal.
    • Decree/Order/Judgment: Formal adjudication / interim direction / final decision with reasons.
  • Landmark cases:
    • Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): Basic structure doctrine — Parliament cannot alter the Constitution's basic structure.
    • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978): Expanded Article 21 — right to life and personal liberty includes right to travel abroad; procedure must be fair, just, reasonable.
    • Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975): Election dispute; part of basic structure doctrine context.
    • Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles; judicial review is basic structure.
    • S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): Article 356 (President's Rule) limitations; secularism is basic structure.
    • Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): Sexual harassment at workplace guidelines before legislation.
    • Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985): Right to livelihood is part of Article 21.
    • MC Mehta cases: Environmental protection, oleum gas leak, polluter pays.
    • Indira Sawhney v. Union of India (1992): Mandal case — 27% OBC reservations, creamy layer exclusion.
    • Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018): Decriminalized consensual homosexual relations (Section 377 partially struck down).
    • Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018): Decriminalized adultery (Section 497 struck down).
    • Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017): Right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21.
    • Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017): Triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) declared unconstitutional.
    • Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): Sabarimala — women of all ages can enter temple.
    • K.S. Puttaswamy (2017): Privacy — see above.
    • Common Cause v. Union of India (2018): Right to die with dignity — passive euthanasia and living will.
    • Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020): Internet shutdowns must be temporary, proportionate, and published.
  • Constitutional amendments:
    • 1st Amendment (1951): Added reasonable restrictions on free speech (Articles 19(2), 31A, 31B, Ninth Schedule).
    • 24th Amendment (1971): Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights.
    • 25th Amendment (1971): Curbed right to property; gave effect to Directive Principles.
    • 42nd Amendment (1976): 'Mini Constitution' — added Socialist, Secular, Integrity to Preamble; Fundamental Duties (Art 51A); Directive Principles precedence.
    • 44th Amendment (1978): Right to Property removed from Fundamental Rights (made legal right under Art 300A); emergency safeguards.
    • 52nd Amendment (1985): Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule).
    • 73rd & 74th Amendments (1992): Panchayats and Municipalities (Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules).
    • 86th Amendment (2002): Right to Education (Article 21A) for ages 6–14.
    • 89th Amendment (2003): National Commission for SCs/STs bifurcated.
    • 91st Amendment (2003): Anti-defection strengthening; cabinet size limit (15% of Lok Sabha).
    • 97th Amendment (2011): Cooperative societies (Article 43B, Part IXB).
    • 101st Amendment (2016): GST (Article 246A, 269A, 279A).
    • 102nd Amendment (2018): Constitutional status to National Commission for Backward Classes (Article 338B).
    • 103rd Amendment (2019): 10% EWS reservation (Articles 15(6), 16(6)).
    • 104th Amendment (2020): Extended SC/ST reservation to 2030; ended Anglo-Indian nomination.
    • 105th Amendment (2021): States can identify OBCs (restored state power after 102nd).
  • Legal bodies:
    • Supreme Court: Apex court; Articles 124–147; collegium appointments; Article 32 writ jurisdiction.
    • High Courts: Articles 214–231; Article 226 writ jurisdiction.
    • National Legal Services Authority (NALSA): Free legal aid; Lok Adalats.
    • Bar Council of India: Regulates legal profession and legal education.
    • Law Commission of India: Recommends legal reforms.
    • National Human Rights Commission (NHRC): Statutory (1993) — human rights protection.
    • National Commission for Women (NCW): Statutory (1992) — women's rights.
    • National Commission for SCs/STs/OBCs: Constitutional bodies (Articles 338, 338A, 338B).
    • Central Vigilance Commission (CVC): Statutory (2003) — anti-corruption vigilance.
    • Lokpal: Statutory anti-corruption body at Centre (Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013).
    • Election Commission of India: Article 324 — conducts elections.
    • National Green Tribunal (NGT): Statutory (2010) — environmental disputes.
    • Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT): Recovery of bank dues.
    • National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT): Company law and insolvency (IBC).
    • Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions: Consumer protection (Consumer Protection Act, 2019).
  • Important laws:
    • Constitution of India (1950)
    • Indian Penal Code, 1860 (now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023)
    • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)
    • Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023)
    • Indian Contract Act, 1872
    • Right to Information Act, 2005
    • Consumer Protection Act, 2019
    • Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
    • Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2014
    • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
    • Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
    • Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
    • Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013
    • Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009
    • National Food Security Act, 2013
    • Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
    • Goods and Services Tax (Constitutional Amendment), 2016 / CGST Act, 2017
    • Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023
    • Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (2023 — new criminal laws replacing IPC, CrPC, Evidence Act)
Technique: Basic structure
Question: Which case established the basic structure doctrine?
Answer: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973).
Technique: Habeas corpus
Question: Which writ is used to produce a detained person before court?
Answer: Habeas corpus ('you shall have the body').

Common Traps

  • Confusing writs (habeas corpus vs mandamus vs certiorari vs prohibition vs quo warranto).
  • Mixing up amendment numbers (e.g., 86th = education, 101st = GST).
  • Thinking IPC still applies — replaced by Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (2023) for new offences.
  • Missing that PIL relaxes locus standi (public-spirited person can file for others).
  • Confusing NALSA (legal aid) with NHRC (human rights).

Memory Tricks

  • Basic structure: Kesavananda Bharati (1973).
  • Privacy: Puttaswamy (2017), Article 21.
  • GST: 101st Amendment (2016).
  • Education: 86th Amendment (2002), Article 21A.
  • Anti-defection: 52nd Amendment, Tenth Schedule.
Legal GK exam strategy
Memorize landmark cases with year and one-line holding; constitutional amendments with number and subject; legal terms with one-line meaning. For passage-based questions, read the passage first — it often contains the answer context.

Doctrine of Eclipse and Severability in Constitutional Adjudication

The doctrine of eclipse holds that a pre‑constitutional law which conflicts with a fundamental right does not become void ab initio; it remains dormant — eclipsed — until the constitutional inconsistency is removed, either by amendment or by judicial interpretation that narrows the right. The Supreme Court first articulated this in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955), where a motor vehicles law inconsistent with Article 19(1)(g) was held to be merely eclipsed. The law revives automatically when the constitutional barrier disappears, without the need for fresh legislation.

Severability, by contrast, operates when a statute contains both constitutional and unconstitutional provisions. The court excises the offending part while preserving the remainder, provided the valid portion is capable of independent operation and the legislature would have enacted it alone. The test was laid down in R.M.D.C. v. Union of India (1957): (i) the unconstitutional provision must be separable in substance and form; (ii) the remaining statute must be workable; (iii) the legislative intent must not be defeated. In State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills (1974) the Court refused severability because the invalid clause was integral to the statutory scheme.

A practical distinction for examiners: eclipse applies only to pre‑constitutional laws, whereas severability applies to any statute, pre‑ or post‑constitutional. Moreover, eclipse is automatic revival; severability requires a judicial declaration. Questions often mix the two by asking whether a 1950 law that violated Article 19 becomes void or eclipsed — answer: eclipsed, and it revives if the fundamental right is later amended or read down.

Recent illustration: the 2023 amendment to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita removed certain colonial‑era offences that had been eclipsed by Article 21 jurisprudence. The amendment did not “re‑enact” them; it merely cleared the eclipse, confirming the doctrine’s continuing relevance.

Judicial Review of Legislative Privileges: The Keshav Singh and Raja Ram Pal Cases

Legislative privileges — freedom of speech in the House, immunity from civil arrest, and the power to punish contempt — are enshrined in Articles 105 and 194. However, they are not absolute. The Supreme Court in Keshav Singh v. Speaker, Legislative Assembly (1965) held that the power to punish for contempt is subject to judicial review for mala fide exercise, violation of natural justice, or excess of jurisdiction. The Court issued a writ of habeas corpus to release a person detained by the Assembly, establishing that privilege cannot shield arbitrary detention.

In Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) the Court extended this principle to the expulsion of members. It ruled that the Speaker’s decision is justiciable when it affects a member’s constitutional right to participate in proceedings, and that the decision must satisfy the test of reasonableness under Article 14. The judgment clarified that while the House is the sole judge of its internal proceedings, the judiciary may intervene where constitutional rights are infringed.

A frequent examiner twist: presenting a scenario where a legislator is expelled for “misconduct” defined only by a House resolution, and asking whether the courts can review. The correct answer — yes, if the expulsion lacks procedural fairness or violates fundamental rights, per Raja Ram Pal. Another trap: confusing the British model (parliamentary sovereignty, no judicial review of privileges) with the Indian model (constitutional sovereignty, limited review).

The 2021 Mahua Moitra case (pending) may further delineate the boundary between political questions and justiciable privilege disputes, but the settled law remains the two‑pronged test: (i) does the privilege claim involve a constitutional right? (ii) is the exercise of privilege arbitrary or mala fide?

Technique: Distinguishing Eclipse from Severability
A 1948 state law criminalises “sedition” in terms broader than Article 19(2) permits. After the Constitution comes into force, the law is challenged. The state argues the law is merely eclipsed and will revive if Article 19(2) is amended. The petitioner argues the law is void and must be struck down. Which doctrine applies and what is the outcome?
The law is pre‑constitutional, so the doctrine of eclipse applies. It is not void ab initio; it remains dormant while the fundamental right prevails. If Article 19(2) is later amended to accommodate the broader definition, the law revives automatically. Severability does not apply because the statute is not a composite enactment with separable parts. Therefore, the court will declare the law eclipsed, not struck down.
Exam‑Day Strategy
When a question mentions a pre‑constitutional statute and a fundamental right, first identify whether the statute is being challenged as a whole (eclipse) or whether only a clause is alleged unconstitutional (severability). Write the governing case name (Bhikaji for eclipse, R.M.D.C. for severability) and the one‑line test. This two‑step tag fetches full marks in both MCQ and descriptive formats.

Evolution of the Collegium System: From First Judges Case to NJAC Judgment

The collegium system — the mechanism by which the higher judiciary appoints and transfers judges — emerged through a series of Supreme Court decisions known as the “Judges Cases”. In the First Judges Case (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981) the Court held that “consultation” with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in Article 124(2) did not mean “concurrence”; the executive could override the CJI’s opinion. This executive primacy lasted until the Second Judges Case (Supreme Court Advocates‑on‑Record Association v. Union of India, 1993), where a nine‑judge bench reversed the position, declaring that the CJI’s opinion, formed after consulting the two senior‑most judges, would have primacy. The Third Judges Case (1998) expanded the collegium to the CJI plus four senior‑most judges for Supreme Court appointments, and the CJI plus two senior‑most judges for High Court appointments.

The collegium’s opacity drew criticism, leading to the 99th Constitutional Amendment (2014) and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, which sought to include the Law Minister and two eminent persons. In the Fourth Judges Case (2015) the Court struck down the NJAC by a 4:1 majority, holding that judicial primacy is part of the basic structure and that the NJAC violated judicial independence. The Court, however, invited suggestions to improve the collegium’s transparency, resulting in the 2017 “Memorandum of Procedure” (MoP) revisions — still not fully implemented.

Key examiner hooks: (i) the shift from “consultation” to “concurrence” between the First and Second Judges Cases; (ii) the basic‑structure argument used to invalidate NJAC; (iii) the distinction between appointment (collegium) and transfer (CJI + two senior judges). A common trap is to state that the NJAC was upheld because it had parliamentary backing — the correct answer is that parliamentary amendment cannot alter the basic structure.

As of 2024, the collegium remains the sole appointing authority, with the MoP providing for a “statement of reasons” for each recommendation, but the executive retains a limited role of returning names for reconsideration once.

Public Interest Litigation: Locus Standi Relaxation, Judicial Activism, and Recent Restrictions

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) originated in the late 1970s when the Supreme Court, in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979), entertained a letter from a journalist as a writ petition on behalf of undertrial prisoners. The Court relaxed the traditional locus standi requirement — that only a person whose legal right is infringed may approach the court — allowing any “public‑spirited citizen” to file on behalf of a disadvantaged group. This was formalised in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), which held that the rule of locus standi is a procedural technicality that must yield to the constitutional mandate of access to justice.

The expansion continued through Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) (bonded labour), Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) (sexual harassment guidelines), and People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1997) (telephone tapping). The Court also innovated remedial tools: continuing mandamus, court‑appointed commissions, and structural injunctions.

However, from the 2000s the Court began imposing gatekeeping measures to curb frivolous PILs. In State of Uttarakhand v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) it laid down a three‑point test: (i) the petitioner must act bona fide; (ii) the matter must affect a large class; (iii) there must be no alternative remedy. The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 introduced a “PIL registry” and required an affidavit disclosing the petitioner’s credentials and funding sources. In Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2014) the Court dismissed a PIL challenging the appointment of a Governor, reiterating that political questions are not PIL‑worthy.

Examiner twists: (a) asking whether a corporate entity can file a PIL — answer: yes, if it demonstrates public interest, but the Court scrutinises motive; (b) confusing PIL with class action under the Code of Civil Procedure — PIL is a constitutional writ jurisdiction, not a statutory class action; (c) assuming any letter to the Court becomes a PIL — the Court must be satisfied of the three‑point test before converting it.

Statutory Bodies vs Constitutional Bodies: Appointment, Removal, and Functional Autonomy

Constitutional bodies derive their existence, composition, and powers directly from the Constitution (e.g., Election Commission under Article 324, Finance Commission under Article 280, National Commissions for SCs/STs/OBCs under Articles 338, 338A, 338B). Their members enjoy security of tenure — removal only by impeachment or a Supreme Court inquiry — and their conditions of service cannot be varied to their disadvantage after appointment.

Statutory bodies are created by an Act of Parliament (e.g., National Human Rights Commission under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993; Central Vigilance Commission under the CVC Act, 2003; Lokpal under the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013). Their composition, tenure, and removal are governed by the parent statute, which can be amended by a simple parliamentary majority. The President appoints members on the recommendation of a selection committee, but the statute may prescribe qualifications, term length, and grounds for removal (often “proved misbehaviour or incapacity” after a Supreme Court inquiry).

Functional autonomy differs: constitutional bodies report directly to the President or Parliament and are insulated from executive control. Statutory bodies, while intended to be independent, often depend on the parent ministry for budget and administrative support, creating de facto executive influence. The Supreme Court in Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) emphasised that statutory bodies must be “functionally independent” and directed the government to ensure financial autonomy for the NHRC and CVC.

Examiner focus: (i) distinguishing removal procedures — constitutional bodies require a two‑thirds parliamentary majority (impeachment) or Supreme Court inquiry; statutory bodies require a statutory process, often a simple majority resolution; (ii) identifying which body is constitutional — e.g., the National Commission for Women is statutory (1990 Act), not constitutional; (iii) noting that the 102nd Amendment gave constitutional status to the NCBC, moving it from statutory to constitutional category.

  • Confusing eclipse (pre‑constitutional law) with severability (any statute) and stating the law becomes void instead of dormant.
  • Assuming legislative privileges are immune from judicial review; forgetting the Keshav Singh and Raja Ram Pal limits.
  • Claiming the NJAC was upheld because Parliament passed it; overlooking the basic‑structure doctrine that protects judicial primacy.
  • Treating any letter to the Court as a PIL without applying the three‑point bona fide, class‑impact, alternative‑remedy test.
  • Equating statutory bodies with constitutional bodies on tenure and removal; missing that statutory bodies can be abolished by ordinary legislation.
  • Stating that the National Commission for Women is a constitutional body; it is statutory under the 1990 Act.
  • Believing the collegium includes the Law Minister after the NJAC judgment; the NJAC was struck down, so the collegium remains judge‑only.

Practice Questions

← Current Affairs Static GK →