Constitution & Polity
Learning Objectives
- Trace the constitutional evolution from the Regulating Act (1773) to the Indian Independence Act (1947), with source acts and years.
- Explain the Constituent Assembly’s composition, committees, and the Objective Resolution’s role in shaping the Preamble.
- Analyse the Preamble’s components, its justiciability, and the 42nd Amendment (1976) changes with the Kesavananda Bharati (1973) basic-structure doctrine.
- Distinguish the Constitution’s borrowed features and their source constitutions, and evaluate India’s federal-with-unitary-bias design.
- Write GS II answers using the chronology–provision–judicial interpretation–critique framework.
1. Historical Underpinnings
The Indian Constitution did not emerge in 1950 from nothing. It evolved through a century of colonial governance experiments, and several institutional features trace directly to specific British Acts. Knowing this history lets you answer why certain choices were made — not just what they are.
| Act / Year | Key Provision | Constitutional Legacy | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regulating Act, 1773 | First parliamentary step to regulate the East India Company; created Governor-General of Bengal (Warren Hastings) and a Supreme Court at Calcutta. | Centralised authority under a Governor-General; judicial supremacy introduced. | Historical underpinning; colonial precursor to executive centralisation |
| Pitt’s India Act, 1784 | Dual control — Company managed commerce; British government managed politics via a Board of Control. | Dual executive idea (nominal vs real) echoes in President vs Prime Minister. | Board of Control precedent for political oversight |
| Charter Acts, 1813 • 1833 • 1853 | Ended trade monopoly (except tea/opium); centralised law-making; introduced open competition for civil services (1853). | Legislative centralisation; merit-based civil services (foundation of Article 315/320 UPSC/SPSC). | Charter Act 1833 — first central legislature |
| Government of India Act, 1858 | After the 1857 revolt, Crown took over; Secretary of State for India ruled through the Governor-General (now Viceroy). | Unitary centre under Crown — precedent for strong Union in Article 1. | Crown rule; end of Company rule |
| Indian Councils Act, 1861 | Indians entered the Viceroy’s legislative council; legislative powers restored to Bombay and Madras presidencies. | Decentralisation seed — evolved into federal distribution (Seventh Schedule). | First legislative devolution |
| Indian Councils Act, 1892 | Indirect election; budget discussion rights (no voting on demands). | Representative principle — precursor to elected legislature. | Budget discussion precedent |
| Indian Councils Act, 1909 (Morley-Minto) | Separate electorates for Muslims; increased Indian membership in councils. | Communal representation — later rejected by the Constitution (Article 15/16), but shaped minority safeguards. | Separate electorates; communal award context |
| Government of India Act, 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford) | Dyarchy in provinces — transferred subjects (Indian ministers) and reserved subjects (British officials). Bicameral central legislature. | Provincial autonomy precursor; dyarchy failed but taught power-sharing. | Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms |
| Government of India Act, 1935 | Proposed All-India Federation; provincial autonomy; dyarchy at Centre (not implemented); Federal Court; three lists (federal, provincial, concurrent). | Administrative bulk of the Constitution (especially Seventh Schedule lists) is drawn from this Act. | Primary structural source of the Constitution |
| Indian Independence Act, 1947 | Ended British rule; created dominions of India and Pakistan; made the Constituent Assembly sovereign; ended treaty relations with princely states. | Constituent Assembly became the sovereign constitution-making body. | Transfer of power; sovereignty |
Sources: Government of India Acts (1773–1935); Indian Independence Act, 1947; Constituent Assembly Debates. The Government of India Act, 1935 is the single largest structural source for the Indian Constitution.
1.1 The 1857 Revolt as a Constitutional Turning Point
The revolt of 1857 ended Company rule and began direct Crown rule (Government of India Act, 1858). Constitutionally, it shifted sovereignty from a commercial corporation to the British Crown, and created the Secretary of State for India — a political executive in London answerable to Parliament. This chain of accountability (Crown → Secretary of State → Viceroy → provincial governments) is the colonial ancestor of India’s parliamentary executive: real power with the Council of Ministers, nominal authority with the head of state.
1.2 Why the Government of India Act, 1935 Dominates
The 1935 Act ran to 321 sections and 10 schedules. It introduced: (a) provincial autonomy with elected ministries; (b) a Federal Court (ancestor of the Supreme Court); (c) the three-fold distribution of legislative powers (Federal, Provincial, Concurrent Lists) that became the Seventh Schedule; (d) emergency and safeguard provisions; and (e) a public service commission framework. When the Constituent Assembly drafted the Constitution, it adopted most of the administrative machinery wholesale — which is why students of the Constitution must read the 1935 Act alongside it.
1.3 PYQ Integration
- PYQ 2013: “The Government of India Act, 1935 is considered the most important constitutional landmark in the evolution of the Indian Constitution. Discuss.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2013
- PYQ 2018: “The Indian Constitution is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society.” Elucidate with reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty. (15 marks) — PYQ 2018
- PYQ 2022: “Examine the scope of Fundamental Rights in the light of the latest judgements of the Supreme Court.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2022
2. Making of the Constitution
The Constituent Assembly was the sovereign body that drafted, debated, and adopted the Constitution. Its composition, procedures, and committee structure determined the final text.
| Aspect | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Origin | Cabinet Mission Plan (May 1946); not directly elected by universal franchise | Cabinet Mission, 1946 |
| Total Seats | 389 (292 British India + 93 Princely States); reduced to 299 after Partition | Indian Independence Act, 1947 |
| Election Method | Indirect election by provincial legislative assemblies (single transferable vote) | Cabinet Mission Plan |
| First Meeting | 9 December 1946 (Muslim League boycotted); 207 members attended | Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. I |
| Chairman | Dr. Rajendra Prasad (elected 11 Dec 1946) | CAD, Vol. I |
| Constitutional Advisor | B.N. Rau (appointed 1946; prepared first draft based on comparative study) | CAD; Rau Papers |
| Drafting Committee | Formed 29 Aug 1947; 7 members (Ambedkar, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, K.M. Munshi, Mohammad Saadullah, B.L. Mitter, D.P. Khaitan) | CAD, Vol. VII |
| Duration | 2 years, 11 months, 18 days (11 sessions, 165 days of sitting) | CAD Records |
| Adoption | 26 November 1949 (signed 24 Jan 1950); commenced 26 January 1950 | Article 394 |
2.1 Major Committees and Their Reports
| Committee | Chairman | Key Contribution | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steering Committee | Dr. Rajendra Prasad | Procedural matters, scheduling | CAD, Vol. I |
| Rules of Procedure Committee | Dr. Rajendra Prasad | Drafted rules for debates and voting | CAD, Vol. I |
| Union Powers Committee | Jawaharlal Nehru | Recommended strong Centre; residuary powers to Union | CAD, Vol. II |
| Provincial Constitution Committee | Sardar Patel | State structure, Governor’s role | CAD, Vol. II |
| Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities | Sardar Patel | Sub-committees on Fundamental Rights (K.T. Shah), Minorities (H.C. Mookherjee) | CAD, Vol. II–III |
| Committee on the Functions of the Constitution | G.V. Mavalankar | Executive-legislative relations | CAD, Vol. III |
| Drafting Committee | B.R. Ambedkar | Prepared the Draft Constitution (Feb 1948); clause-by-clause revision | CAD, Vol. VII–XI |
2.2 The Objective Resolution (13 December 1946)
Moved by Jawaharlal Nehru, the Objective Resolution declared India as an independent sovereign republic, guaranteed justice (social, economic, political), liberty (thought, expression, belief, faith, worship), equality of status and opportunity, and fraternity assuring dignity of the individual and unity of the nation. It became the philosophical foundation of the Preamble. CAD, 13 Dec 1946
2.3 Critical Debates Shaping the Text
- Federalism vs Unitary Bias: The Union Powers Committee (Nehru) recommended residuary powers to the Centre (Article 248), overriding the 1935 Act’s federal distribution. K.T. Shah and H.V. Kamath argued for stronger states; Patel’s pragmatism prevailed. CAD, Vol. II
- Language: Hindi vs English; Munshi-Ayyangar formula (English for 15 years, Hindi as official language) became Articles 343–351. CAD, Vol. VII
- Minority Safeguards: Separate electorates rejected (unlike 1909/1919/1935 Acts); replaced with reservation in legislatures (Articles 330, 332) and cultural/educational rights (Articles 29, 30). CAD, Vol. III
- Judicial Review: Explicitly included (Article 13) despite British parliamentary sovereignty tradition; Ambedkar called it the “heart of the Constitution.” CAD, 25 Nov 1949 (Ambedkar’s closing speech)
2.4 PYQ Integration
- PYQ 2015: “Discuss the role of the Constituent Assembly in the making of the Indian Constitution.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2015
- PYQ 2019: “The drafting of the Indian Constitution was a product of both consensus and conflict. Comment.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2019
- PYQ 2021: “Examine the significance of the Objective Resolution in shaping the Preamble.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2021
3. Preamble
The Preamble is the Constitution’s identity card. It declares the source of authority, the nature of the state, the objectives, and the date of adoption.
3.1 Text and Component Analysis
| Component | Phrasing | Constitutional Significance | Source / Amendment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Source of Authority | “We, the people of India” | Popular sovereignty; Constitution derives legitimacy from the people, not Crown or Parliament | Original (1949) |
| Nature of State | Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic, Republic | Defines the republic’s character; each adjective is justiciable in context | Original + 42nd Amdt (1976) added Socialist, Secular |
| Objectives | Justice (social, economic, political); Liberty (thought, expression, belief, faith, worship); Equality (status, opportunity); Fraternity (dignity, unity, integrity) | Directive Principles (Part IV) operationalise justice; Fundamental Rights (Part III) secure liberty/equality; Article 51A(e) codifies fraternity | Original (from Objective Resolution) |
| Date of Adoption | 26 November 1949 | Constitution adopted; commenced 26 January 1950 (Article 394) | Article 394 |
3.2 Is the Preamble Part of the Constitution? — Judicial Evolution
| Case | Year | Holding | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Re Berubari Union | 1960 | Preamble is not part of the Constitution; not a source of power or limitation | Advisory opinion on Art. 143; strict textualism |
| Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala | 1973 | Preamble is part of the Constitution; basic structure doctrine; Preamble aids interpretation | 7:6 majority; overruled Berubari |
| S.R. Bommai v. Union of India | 1994 | Secularism is part of basic structure; Preamble’s adjectives are enforceable as constitutional values | President’s Rule in states; secularism test |
| Union Government v. LIC of India | 1995 | Preamble is a key to the makers’ mind; can be used to resolve ambiguity | Interpretive tool |
3.3 The 42nd Amendment (1976) — “Socialist” and “Secular”
Inserted during the Emergency (1975–77). Kesavananda Bharati (1973) had already held the Preamble amendable subject to basic structure. The 42nd Amendment added “Socialist” and “Secular” and changed “unity of the nation” to “unity and integrity of the nation.” S.R. Bommai (1994) later confirmed secularism as basic structure. 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976
3.4 PYQ Integration
- PYQ 2014: “The Preamble of the Constitution of India is a part of the Constitution. Discuss.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2014
- PYQ 2017: “Examine the significance of the words ‘Socialist’ and ‘Secular’ in the Preamble.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2017
- PYQ 2020: “The Preamble is the soul of the Constitution. Elucidate with reference to judicial pronouncements.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2020
- PYQ 2023: “Discuss the amendability of the Preamble under Article 368 in light of the Kesavananda Bharati judgement.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2023
4. Salient Features
Salient features questions test whether you can distinguish India’s constitutional design from other models and explain why each feature exists.
4.1 Written, Lengthy, and Detailed
395 Articles (original), 12 Schedules, ~145,000 words — the world’s longest written constitution. Reason: (a) borrowed the Government of India Act, 1935’s administrative detail; (b) incorporated diversity management (linguistic, religious, tribal); (c) included justiciable Directive Principles (unlike Ireland) and Fundamental Duties (unlike USSR/Japan). CAD, Vol. VII (Ambedkar: “We have not merely copied”)
4.2 Borrowed Features — Source Constitutions
| Feature | Source Constitution | Indian Adaptation |
|---|---|---|
| Parliamentary system, Rule of Law, Single Citizenship, Cabinet system, Prerogative writs, Legislative procedure | United Kingdom | No parliamentary sovereignty; judicial review; written constitution limits Parliament |
| Federal structure, Written constitution, Supreme Court, Judicial review, Preamble, Fundamental Rights, Impeachment of President, Vice-President as RS Chairman | United States | Strong Centre (residuary powers to Union); no dual citizenship; integrated judiciary |
| Directive Principles of State Policy, Method of Presidential election, Nomination of RS members | Ireland | DPSPs non-justiciable (Art. 37); President elected by electoral college, not directly |
| Concurrent List, Freedom of trade/commerce, Joint sitting of Parliament | Australia | Concurrent List + residuary to Centre (unlike Australia where residuary to States) |
| Quasi-federal (Centre strong), Distribution of powers, Residuary powers to Centre, Advisory jurisdiction of SC | Canada | Adopted Canadian centralisation but with own Concurrent List |
| Fundamental Duties, Emergency provisions (Art. 352/356/360), Five-Year Plans | USSR (Russia) | Duties added 1976 (42nd Amdt); Emergencies more structured than USSR |
| Procedure established by law (Art. 21), Suspension of rights during emergency | Japan (1947 Constitution) | Maneka Gandhi (1978) read “due process” into Art. 21 |
| Amendment procedure (Art. 368), Republicanism | South Africa | Amendment simpler than US; no referendum required |
| Ideals of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity in Preamble | France | Fraternity added as “unity and integrity” (42nd Amdt) |
| Emergency provisions (Art. 352), Suspension of Fundamental Rights | Weimar Germany | Art. 359 allows suspension of Art. 19 only; Art. 20/21 non-suspendable (44th Amdt) |
4.3 Federalism with Unitary Bias
India is a “Union of States” (Article 1) — not a federation of states. Key unitary features: (1) Single constitution for Centre and States; (2) Single citizenship; (3) Integrated judiciary (Supreme Court at apex); (4) All-India Services (Article 312); (5) Residuary powers to Centre (Article 248); (6) Parliament can alter state boundaries (Article 3); (7) Emergency provisions convert federation into unitary system (Articles 352, 356, 360); (8) Governor appointed by Centre (Article 155); (9) Integrated audit (CAG) and election (ECI).
4.4 Parliamentary System
Executive responsible to legislature; President nominal head (Article 53), real power with Council of Ministers headed by PM (Article 74/75). Collective responsibility (Article 75(3)). Differences from UK: (a) Written constitution; (b) Judicial review; (c) Fixed term (5 years) unless dissolved; (d) Elected President (indirect); (e) Rajya Sabha not subject to dissolution.
4.5 Integrated and Independent Judiciary
Single hierarchy: Supreme Court (Article 124) → High Courts (Article 214) → Subordinate courts. No separate federal/state courts (unlike US). Independence: security of tenure (Art. 124(2)/217(1)), salaries charged on Consolidated Fund (Art. 125/221), appointment by President in consultation with CJI (collegium system post-Third Judges Case, 1998).
4.6 Fundamental Rights vs Directive Principles vs Fundamental Duties
| Aspect | Fundamental Rights (Part III) | Directive Principles (Part IV) | Fundamental Duties (Part IVA) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Articles | 12–35 | 36–51 | 51A (added 42nd Amdt 1976; 11th duty added 86th Amdt 2002) |
| Nature | Justiciable (enforceable by courts) | Non-justiciable (Art. 37); fundamental in governance | Non-justiciable; moral obligations |
| Source | US Bill of Rights; French Declaration | Irish Constitution | USSR Constitution; Swaran Singh Committee (1976) |
| Key Cases | Kesavananda (basic structure), Maneka Gandhi (Art. 21), Navtej Johar (Art. 15/21) | Minerva Mills (1980): balance FR/DPSP; Unni Krishnan (1993): right to education | No direct enforcement; cited in Ranganath Misra (1996) for citizen duties |
| Amendability | Subject to basic structure (Kesavananda, Waman Rao) | Amendable; but not to destroy basic structure (Minerva Mills) | Amendable (86th Amdt added duty 11) |
4.7 PYQ Integration
- PYQ 2013: “The Indian Constitution is federal in form but unitary in spirit. Comment.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2013
- PYQ 2016: “Discuss the salient features of the Indian Constitution.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2016
- PYQ 2020: “The Directive Principles of State Policy are non-justiciable but fundamental in governance. Elucidate.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2020
- PYQ 2022: “Examine the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles in the light of judicial pronouncements.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2022
5. Union and Its Territory
Articles 1–4 define India’s territorial composition and Parliament’s power to reorganise it. This section is frequently tested for its procedural nuances.
5.1 Article 1 — Name and Territory
“India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.” The territory comprises: (a) territories of the States; (b) Union Territories; (c) territories that may be acquired. Key: “Union of States” (not “Federation of States”) — States have no right to secede. The First Schedule lists States and UTs. Article 1
5.2 Article 2 — Admission/Establishment of New States
Parliament may by law admit new States into the Union or establish new States on such terms as it thinks fit. Examples: Sikkim (36th Amendment, 1975 — admitted as State); Goa (1987); Telangana (2014). Requires simple majority (Article 4 declares such laws not amendments under Article 368). Article 2
5.3 Article 3 — Formation of New States and Alteration of Areas
Parliament may by law: (a) form a new State by separation/union; (b) increase/diminish area; (c) alter boundaries/names. Procedure: (1) Bill introduced in Parliament only on President’s recommendation; (2) President refers to affected State Legislature for views (not consent); (3) Parliament not bound by State’s views; (4) Simple majority. Not an Article 368 amendment (Article 4). Article 3
5.4 Article 4 — Supplemental Provisions
Laws under Articles 2/3 may contain supplemental, incidental, and consequential provisions (e.g., amendment of First Schedule, Fourth Schedule, representation in Parliament). Such laws are not deemed amendments under Article 368. Article 4
5.5 Union Territories — Articles 239–241
UTs administered by President through an Administrator (Lieutenant Governor/Chief Commissioner). Delhi and Puducherry have legislatures (Articles 239AA/239A). NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018, 2023): LG bound by aid and advice of CoM except land, police, public order; Parliament retains supreme legislative power over UT. Article 239AA; NCT of Delhi v. UOI (2018) 5 SCC 1; (2023) 5 SCC 1
5.6 Acquired Territories
Territories acquired by India (e.g., Goa 1961, Sikkim 1975, enclaves exchange with Bangladesh 2015 per 100th Amendment) become part of India’s territory under Article 1(c). No separate constitutional provision needed; executive action + Parliamentary law suffices. 100th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2015 (Land Boundary Agreement)
5.7 PYQ Integration
- PYQ 2014: “Distinguish between Article 2 and Article 3 of the Constitution.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2014
- PYQ 2018: “Parliament’s power to reorganise States under Article 3 is plenary. Discuss.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2018
- PYQ 2021: “Examine the constitutional status of Union Territories with special reference to Delhi.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2021
- PYQ 2023: “Article 3 empowers Parliament to alter State boundaries without State consent. Critically examine.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2023
6. Citizenship
Articles 5–11 (Part II) define citizenship at commencement; Parliament regulates subsequent acquisition/termination (Citizenship Act, 1955). Single citizenship for the whole of India (Article 9).
6.1 Citizenship at Commencement (26 January 1950) — Articles 5–8
| Article | Category | Conditions |
|---|---|---|
| Article 5 | Domicile in India | Born in India; OR either parent born in India; OR ordinarily resident 5 years before commencement |
| Article 6 | Migrants from Pakistan | Pre-19 July 1948: automatic if resident since migration; Post-19 July 1948: registered after 6 months residence |
| Article 7 | Migrants to Pakistan (after 1 March 1947) | Deemed NOT citizens; exception: return with permit for resettlement |
| Article 8 | Persons of Indian Origin abroad | Registered by Indian diplomatic/consular representative if they or parents/grandparents born in undivided India |
6.2 Loss and Acquisition under the Citizenship Act, 1955
| Mode | Section | Key Conditions | Amendments |
|---|---|---|---|
| By Birth | Section 3 | Born in India: (a) 26 Jan 1950 – 1 Jul 1987: automatic; (b) 1 Jul 1987 – 3 Dec 2004: either parent citizen; (c) Post-3 Dec 2004: both parents citizens OR one citizen + other not illegal migrant | 1986, 1992, 2003, 2005, 2015, 2019 |
| By Descent | Section 4 | Born outside India: father/mother citizen by birth/registration; registration at consulate within 1 year (extendable) | 1992 (mother), 2003 (registration) |
| By Registration | Section 5 | PIOs, spouses, minor children, etc.; 7 years residence (reduced to 5 for some categories) | 2003, 2005, 2015 |
| By Naturalisation | Section 6 | 12 years residence (11+1); good character; knowledge of language; intention to reside | 2003 (12 years), 2019 (CAA) |
| By Incorporation of Territory | Section 7 | Government specifies persons becoming citizens when territory joins India | Sikkim (1975), Goa (1987) |
| Termination / Renunciation | Sections 8, 9 | Voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship = termination (Art. 9); Renunciation by declaration | Section 9 upheld in State of Kerala v. V.V. Giri (1970) |
6.3 Key Amendments to the Citizenship Act
- 1986 Amendment: Restricted birthright citizenship — at least one parent must be citizen (response to Assam agitation). Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1986
- 2003 Amendment: Introduced “illegal migrant” definition; barred illegal migrants from citizenship by birth/registration/naturalisation; created National Register of Citizens (NRC) framework. Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003
- 2015 Amendment: Merged PIO and OCI cards into OCI; relaxed residence for registration. Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2015
- 2019 Amendment (CAA): Exempts Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, Christian migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan (entered before 31 Dec 2014) from “illegal migrant” definition; reduces naturalisation residence from 11 to 5 years. Constitutional challenge pending (Indian Union Muslim League v. Union of India, SC Constitution Bench). Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019; Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1470/2019
6.4 Judicial Interpretation
- State of Kerala v. V.V. Giri (1970): Voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship terminates Indian citizenship automatically (Article 9). AIR 1970 SC 1505
- Louis De Raedt v. Union of India (1991): Foreigners have no fundamental right to reside in India; government’s expulsion power is plenary. AIR 1991 SC 1886
- Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India (2014): Referred Section 6A (Assam Accord citizenship cut-off 24 March 1971) to Constitution Bench; pending. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 562/2012
- NRC/CAA Context: Supreme Court monitored NRC in Assam (2019); CAA constitutional validity under challenge (Article 14: reasonable classification vs arbitrariness; Article 21: due process). Supreme Court Constitution Bench hearings, 2023–24
6.5 Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)
Not dual citizenship. OCI cardholders: (a) lifelong visa-free travel; (b) parity with NRIs in economic/financial/educational fields; (c) no voting rights, no public office, no agricultural land purchase. Governed by Sections 7A–7D (inserted 2003, amended 2005/2015). Citizenship Act, 1955, Sections 7A–7D
6.6 PYQ Integration
- PYQ 2015: “Explain the provisions of citizenship in the Constitution. How is citizenship acquired and lost?” (15 marks) — PYQ 2015
- PYQ 2017: “Discuss the significance of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2017
- PYQ 2020: “The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 has been challenged on constitutional grounds. Discuss.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2020
- PYQ 2022: “Examine the concept of single citizenship in India and its implications.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2022
7. PYQ Trends & Answer-Writing Framework
7.1 Topic-wise PYQ Frequency (2013–2024)
| Topic | 10-Mark Qs | 15-Mark Qs | Total Appearances | Key Years |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Historical Underpinnings / Making | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2013, 2015, 2019, 2021 |
| Preamble | 4 | 3 | 7 | 2014, 2017, 2020, 2023 |
| Salient Features / Federalism | 5 | 5 | 10 | 2013, 2016, 2020, 2022 |
| Union & Territory (Arts. 1–4) | 4 | 3 | 7 | 2014, 2018, 2021, 2023 |
| Citizenship | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2015, 2017, 2020, 2022 |
| Fundamental Rights (general) | 6 | 6 | 12 | Every year |
| DPSP / Fundamental Duties | 3 | 3 | 6 | 2015, 2018, 2020, 2022 |
7.2 Directive Words — What UPSC Expects
| Directive | Meaning | Structure |
|---|---|---|
| Discuss | Present arguments for and against; balanced view | Intro → Arguments (pro) → Arguments (con) → Synthesis → Conclusion |
| Examine | Deep analysis; probe causes, implications, nuances | Intro → Dimensions (constitutional, judicial, political) → Critique → Conclusion |
| Critically Examine | Examine + explicit evaluation of strengths/weaknesses | Intro → Analysis → Critical assessment (gaps, contradictions) → Conclusion |
| Evaluate | Assess worth/merit; weigh evidence; give judgment | Intro → Criteria → Evidence for/against → Judgment → Conclusion |
| Analyse | Break into components; show interrelationships | Intro → Component 1 → Component 2 → Linkages → Conclusion |
| Comment | Opinion backed by evidence; not mere description | Intro → Key points with evidence → Your reasoned view → Conclusion |
| Elucidate | Clarify with examples, illustrations, case law | Intro → Explanation + 2–3 concrete examples/cases → Conclusion |
7.3 GS II Polity Answer Framework (15-Mark)
7.4 10-Mark vs 15-Mark Differentiation
- 10-Mark (~150 words): Intro (1 line) → 3–4 bullet points with provision + case law + example → 1-line conclusion. No critique paragraph.
- 15-Mark (~250 words): Full framework above. Must include: constitutional text, 2–3 landmark judgments, critique/federal tension, contemporary context (recent amendment, commission report, or scheme).
7.5 Model 15-Mark Answer Structure: “Federalism in India”
Body 1 — Federal Features (Provision): Dual polity (Art. 1, 246); Written constitution; Division of powers (Seventh Schedule); Supremacy of Constitution; Independent judiciary (Art. 124, 214); Bicameralism (Art. 79).
Body 2 — Unitary Features (Provision): Single constitution; Single citizenship (Art. 9); Integrated judiciary; All-India Services (Art. 312); Residuary powers to Centre (Art. 248); Parliament can alter State boundaries (Art. 3); Emergency provisions (Arts. 352, 356, 360); Governor as Centre’s agent (Art. 155/156).
Body 3 — Judicial Interpretation: S.R. Bommai (1994): Federalism is basic structure; President’s Rule subject to judicial review. Kuldip Nayar (2006): Federalism ≠ US model; strong Centre is constitutional design.
Critique: Asymmetric federalism (Art. 370 abrogation 2019, Art. 371 special provisions); GST Council (Art. 279A) as cooperative forum; fiscal centralisation (15th FC vertical devolution 41%); NCT of Delhi (2023) on UT’s limited autonomy.
Conclusion: Constitution creates “federalism with a strong Centre” — deliberate design for unity post-Partition. Federalism is basic structure but not absolute; balance shifts contextually.
8. Federalism in Practice — Centre-State Relations
The constitutional text (Articles 245–263) provides the architecture; political practice, judicial interpretation, and fiscal realities determine how federalism actually works. This section moves from provisions to lived institutional dynamics.
8.1 Legislative Relations (Articles 245–255)
| List | Subjects (Illustrative) | Key Articles | Judicial Principle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Union List (List I) — 97 subjects | Defence, foreign affairs, atomic energy, railways, banking, insurance, inter-state trade, citizenship, elections to Parliament | Art. 246(1), Seventh Schedule | Parliament has exclusive power; state law on Union List subject is void (State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, 1959) |
| State List (List II) — 66 subjects | Public order, police, public health, agriculture, land, water, local government, prisons, fisheries | Art. 246(3), Seventh Schedule | State has exclusive power; but Parliament can legislate under Arts. 249, 250, 252, 253 |
| Concurrent List (List III) — 47 subjects | Criminal law, marriage, contracts, bankruptcy, forests, education, population control, labour welfare, electricity | Art. 246(2), Seventh Schedule | Both can legislate; Central law prevails in conflict (Art. 254) Art. 254 |
| Residuary Powers | Any matter not in the three lists (e.g., cyber law, space, new technologies) | Art. 248, Entry 97 List I | Vested in Parliament (unlike US/Canada where residuary to states) Art. 248 |
8.2 Administrative Relations (Articles 256–263)
| Provision | Mechanism | Practice / Critique |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 256 — State obligation to comply with Union laws | States must ensure compliance with Parliament’s laws; Union can give directions | Used to enforce Central laws on state subjects (e.g., environmental laws). Critique: Can become coercive federalism. |
| Art. 257 — Union control over State executive | Union can direct states on: (a) construction/maintenance of national communication; (b) protection of railways | Financial burden on states for Union priorities. S.R. Bommai (1994): Directions must be necessary, not arbitrary. |
| Art. 258 — Union can confer powers on States | President may entrust Union functions to State government (with consent) | Cooperative federalism in action (e.g., disaster management, census). |
| Art. 258A — States can confer powers on Union | Governor may entrust State functions to Union (with consent) | Rarely used; asymmetry (Union entrusts more often). |
| Art. 261 — Public acts, records, judicial proceedings | Full faith and credit across states | Enables seamless inter-state recognition of documents, judgments. |
| Art. 262 — Adjudication of inter-state water disputes | Parliament may provide for adjudication; Supreme Court jurisdiction excluded | Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. Critique: Tribunal awards often delayed (Cauvery, Krishna, Mahanadi). ISWD Act, 1956 |
| Art. 263 — Inter-State Council | President may establish Council to inquire into disputes, discuss common interests, make recommendations | Established 1990 (Sarkaria Commission rec). Dormant for years — met only 12 times in 30+ years. Presidential Order, 1990 |
8.3 The Governor’s Role — Constitutional Design vs Political Reality
Article 155: Governor appointed by President (i.e., Central government). Article 156: Holds office during President’s pleasure (typically 5 years). Article 163: Governor acts on aid and advice of Council of Ministers except where Constitution requires discretion.
| Situation | Constitutional Basis | Judicial Guidance | Critique |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appointment of CM (hung assembly) | Art. 164(1); no majority party | Rameshwar Prasad v. UOI (2006): Invite single largest party/pre-poll alliance; floor test within reasonable time (2006) 2 SCC 1 | Used to install preferred party; floor test delays (Karnataka 2018, Maharashtra 2019, Goa 2017). |
| Dismissal of Ministry / President’s Rule recommendation | Art. 163(2), 356 | S.R. Bommai (1994): Floor test is the only test; Governor’s report subject to judicial review (1994) 3 SCC 1 | “Agent of Centre” perception; Art. 356 misuse (100+ times pre-Bommai, ~10 post-Bommai). |
| Reservation of Bills for President’s assent | Art. 200; Art. 201 | Nabam Rebia (2016): Governor cannot sit indefinitely; must act within reasonable time (2016) 8 SCC 1 | Pocket veto — Bills kept pending for years (Tamil Nadu NEET Bill, Kerala Lok Ayukta Bill). |
| Ordinance-making (Art. 213) | When legislature not in session | D.C. Wadhwa (1987): Re-promulgation is fraud on Constitution AIR 1987 SC 579 | Bypassing legislature; Bihar re-promulgated 256 times (1967–81). |
8.4 Inter-State Council (Article 263) — Dormant Potential
- Established: 1990 via Presidential Order on Sarkaria Commission recommendation (Chairman: PM; Members: 6 Union Ministers, all CMs, 5 UTs with legislatures, 5 UTs without).
- Mandate: Inquire into disputes; discuss subjects of common interest; make recommendations for better coordination.
- Performance: Only 12 meetings in 34 years (last 2016). Standing Committee (Home Minister + 5 CMs) more active but advisory.
- Critique: No binding decisions; no independent secretariat; meets only when Centre convenes. Contrast with Australia’s COAG (Council of Australian Governments) — binding intergovernmental agreements.
- Reform: Punchhi Commission: make ISC a permanent constitutional body with independent secretariat, mandatory annual meetings, and recommendatory opinions binding on Centre in fiscal matters.
8.5 GST Council (Article 279A) — Fiscal Federalism in Action
| Aspect | Constitutional Provision | Operational Reality |
|---|---|---|
| Composition | Chair: FM; Members: MoS (Finance), one minister per State (Finance/Tax) | States have 2/3 voting weight; Centre has 1/3. Decisions by 3/4 weighted majority. |
| Voting | Art. 279A(9): 3/4 weighted majority; Centre = 1/3, States = 2/3 | Centre effectively has veto (1/3 > 1/4). No decision can pass without Centre’s support. |
| Dispute Resolution | Art. 279A(11): Council decides mechanism | GST Council Secretariat adjudicates; no independent tribunal yet. States complain of Centre dominating agenda. |
| Compensation | Art. 279A(6): 5-year compensation (2017–22) for revenue loss | Compensation ended June 2022; States demanded extension. Centre borrowed on behalf of States (back-to-back loans) — fiscal architecture stress test. |
| Rate Rationalisation | Council recommends rates | Multiple slabs (0, 5, 12, 18, 28% + cess) persist; compliance burden high. 15th FC recommended 3-rate structure. |
8.6 Fiscal Federalism — Vertical & Horizontal Imbalances
| Indicator | Status | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Vertical Devolution (15th FC) | 41% of divisible pool to States (down from 42% of 14th FC) | Centre retains 59% for defence, subsidies, CSS, debt servicing. |
| Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) | >30 schemes; 60:40 or 90:10 funding | Tied funds reduce State autonomy; “one-size-fits-all” design ignores local priorities. |
| Cess & Surcharge Share | ~18% of gross tax revenue (2023–24) — not part of divisible pool | Centre keeps cesses/surcharges; States get shrinking share of divisible pool. |
| Horizontal Devolution Formula (15th FC) | Income distance (45%), population (15%), area (15%), forest/ecology (10%), demographic performance (12.5%), tax effort (2.5%) | Rewards need (income distance) but penalises high-performing States (demographic performance weight low). |
| State Borrowing Ceiling | 3% of GSDP (FRBM); Centre can permit extra 0.5% for reforms | Centre uses borrowing permission as leverage for reforms (power sector, GST compliance). |
8.7 PYQ Integration — Federalism in Practice
- PYQ 2013: “The Indian Constitution is federal in form but unitary in spirit. Comment.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2013
- PYQ 2016: “Discuss the essentials of cooperative federalism. How far has it been achieved in India?” (15 marks) — PYQ 2016
- PYQ 2017: “The concept of cooperative federalism has been increasingly emphasised. Highlight the drawbacks in the existing structure and the extent to which cooperative federalism would answer them.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2017
- PYQ 2019: “From the resolution of contentious issues regarding distribution of legislative powers, the courts have developed the ‘pith and substance’ and ‘colourable legislation’ doctrines. Discuss.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2019
- PYQ 2020: “The Governor’s office is a controversial constitutional office. Critically examine.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2020
- PYQ 2022: “Examine the role of the Inter-State Council in promoting cooperative federalism.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2022
- PYQ 2023: “The GST Council is a unique experiment in cooperative federalism. Evaluate its functioning.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2023
- PYQ 2024: “Fiscal federalism in India has moved towards centralisation. Critically analyse with reference to the 15th Finance Commission recommendations.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2024
9. Emergency Provisions & Basic Structure Doctrine
Articles 352–360 convert the federal Constitution into a unitary one. The Basic Structure doctrine (from Kesavananda Bharati, 1973) is the Supreme Court’s self-imposed limit on parliamentary amendment power. Together, they define the Constitution’s elastic limits.
9.1 Emergency Provisions — Articles 352, 356, 360
| Emergency | Article | Ground | Approval | Duration | Effect on Federalism | Effect on FRs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| National Emergency | Art. 352 | War, external aggression, armed rebellion (44th Amdt replaced “internal disturbance”) | Cabinet written advice; Parliament special majority (2/3 present & voting, >50% total) within 1 month | 6 months; renewable indefinitely with Parliament approval every 6 months | Centre can give directions to States on any matter (Art. 353); Parliament can legislate on State List (Art. 353/250) | Art. 19 auto-suspended (Art. 358); other FRs suspendable by Presidential order (Art. 359) except Art. 20, 21 (44th Amdt) |
| President’s Rule (State Emergency) | Art. 356 | Constitutional machinery failure in State (Governor’s report or otherwise) | Parliament simple majority within 2 months | 6 months; max 3 years (1 year + 2 years with conditions: (a) EC certifies elections impossible; (b) Art. 352 in force) | President assumes State executive/legislative powers; Parliament exercises State legislative power | No automatic FR suspension; High Court jurisdiction intact |
| Financial Emergency | Art. 360 | Financial stability/credit of India threatened | Parliament simple majority within 2 months | Indefinite until revoked | Centre can direct States on financial propriety; reduce salaries of State/Union judges, All-India Services | No FR suspension |
9.2 President’s Rule (Article 356) — Judicial Evolution
| Case | Year | Principle | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| State of Rajasthan v. Union of India | 1977 | Art. 356 is justiciable; but Court will not question Governor’s report adequacy | Pre-Bommai restraint; political question doctrine |
| S.R. Bommai v. Union of India | 1994 | (1) Federalism = basic structure; (2) Floor test is only test of majority; (3) Governor’s report subject to judicial review; (4) Secularism = basic structure; (5) No mass dismissal of opposition governments | 9-judge bench; ended arbitrary Art. 356 use. Invoked ~100 times pre-1994; ~10 post-1994. (1994) 3 SCC 1 |
| Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India | 2006 | Governor cannot dissolve assembly without giving chance to form government; floor test mandatory | Bihar dissolution (2005) struck down; Governor’s mala fide inferred |
| Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker | 2016 | Governor’s discretion under Art. 163 limited; cannot act against CoM advice without constitutional basis | Arunachal Pradesh President’s Rule quashed; Governor’s actions reviewed |
| S.R. Bommai principles applied | 2018–24 | Karnataka (2018), Maharashtra (2019), Puducherry (2021) — floor tests ordered by SC within days | Judicial enforcement of Bommai has made Art. 356 a last resort |
9.3 Basic Structure Doctrine — Genesis and Evolution
| Case | Year | Question | Holding | Basic Structure Elements Identified |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shankari Prasad v. Union of India | 1951 | Can Parliament amend FRs under Art. 368? | Yes; “amendment” not “law” under Art. 13(2) | None; Parliament’s amending power plenary |
| Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan | 1965 | Same question | Yes (3:2); Dissent (Mudholkar J): Constitution has “basic features” | First articulation of basic features concept (dissent) |
| Golaknath v. State of Punjab | 1967 | Can Parliament amend FRs? | No; Art. 368 is procedure, not power; FRs transcendental | FRs immune from amendment; prospective overruling |
| Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala | 1973 | Extent of Art. 368 power | Parliament can amend any provision but not basic structure (7:6) | Supremacy of Constitution, republican/democratic form, secularism, federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, FRs (Art. 32), rule of law, free & fair elections, parliamentary system (1973) 4 SCC 225 |
| Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain | 1975 | 39th Amendment (Art. 329A) ousting election dispute jurisdiction | Struck down; free & fair elections = basic structure | Judicial review of election disputes; rule of law |
| Minerva Mills v. Union of India | 1980 | 42nd Amendment (Art. 368(4)–(5)): no judicial review of amendments; DPSP primacy over FRs | Struck down both; limited amending power = basic structure; balance between FRs & DPSP = basic structure | Judicial review, balance FR/DPSP, limited amending power (1980) 3 SCC 625 |
| Waman Rao v. Union of India | 1981 | Validity of 9th Schedule laws post-Kesavananda | Laws placed in 9th Schedule after 24 April 1973 (Kesavananda date) subject to basic structure test | 9th Schedule not absolute; IR Coelho (2007) confirmed |
| S.R. Bommai v. Union of India | 1994 | Art. 356 and secularism | Federalism = basic structure; Secularism = basic structure | Expanded basic structure to federalism, secularism |
| I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu | 2007 | 9th Schedule immunity post-Kesavananda | All 9th Schedule laws post-1973 testable on basic structure (Art. 14, 19, 21, judicial review) | Rights test for 9th Schedule; Art. 31B not absolute (2007) 2 SCC 1 |
| Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. UOI (NJAC) | 2015 | 99th Amendment (NJAC) — judicial appointments commission | Struck down 4:1; judicial independence & primacy of CJI = basic structure | Collegium system restored; judicial primacy in appointments non-negotiable (2016) 5 SCC 1 |
9.4 Kesavananda Bharati (1973) — The 7:6 Majority That Saved the Constitution
- Petitioner: Swami Kesavananda Bharati (Edneer Mutt, Kerala) challenged Kerala land reform laws under Art. 26.
- Core Question: Is Parliament’s amending power under Art. 368 unlimited?
- Majority (7): Sikri CJ, Shelat, Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea, Jaganmohan Reddy, Khanna JJ. Khanna J’s pivotal view: “Amendment power is wide but not wide enough to destroy the Constitution’s identity.”
- Minority (6): Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi, Chandrachud JJ: Amending power is plenary.
- Outcome: 24th, 25th, 29th Amendments upheld subject to basic structure. Golaknath overruled prospectively.
- Significance: India avoided the “parliamentary sovereignty” trap (UK) and the “rigid constitution” trap (US). The Court became the Constitution’s guardian of identity.
9.5 Minerva Mills (1980) — Balance as Basic Structure
The 42nd Amendment (1976) attempted to make Parliament’s amending power absolute (Art. 368(4)–(5)) and give DPSPs primacy over FRs (Art. 31C expanded). Minerva Mills struck down both:
- Limited amending power is basic structure: Parliament cannot convert its limited power into unlimited power (Art. 368(4)–(5) destroyed the Kesavananda check).
- Harmony between FRs and DPSPs is basic structure: “The Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution.” (Chandrachud CJ) (1980) 3 SCC 625
9.6 NJAC Case (2015) — Judicial Independence as Basic Structure
| Aspect | 99th Amendment (NJAC) | Collegium (Pre-NJAC / Post-NJAC) |
|---|---|---|
| Composition | CJI (Chair), 2 senior SC judges, Law Minister, 2 “eminent persons” (nominated by PM, LoP, CJI) | CJI + 4 senior SC judges (SC); CJI + 2 senior HC judges (HC) |
| Veto Power | Any 2 members can veto (executive + 1 eminent person = executive veto) | No formal veto; consensus-based; CJI’s view has primacy |
| Transparency | Statutory framework; reasons recorded | Opaque; no written reasons; MOP (Memorandum of Procedure) governs |
| SC Verdict (4:1) | Struck down: executive participation impairs judicial independence (basic structure) | Restored; but Court directed government to finalise revised MOP (still pending) |
| Dissent (Chelameswar J) | NJAC not per se unconstitutional; collegium lacks accountability | Called for reform of collegium, not its retention |
9.7 Basic Structure — Consolidated List for Exams
| Element | Source Case | Exam Application |
|---|---|---|
| Supremacy of Constitution | Kesavananda (1973) | Any amendment making Constitution subordinate to Parliament invalid |
| Republican & Democratic form | Kesavananda (1973) | Cannot convert to monarchy/dictatorship |
| Secularism | Kesavananda; Bommai (1994) | State cannot favour one religion; Art. 356 test |
| Federalism | Bommai (1994) | Centre cannot destroy State autonomy |
| Separation of Powers | Kesavananda (1973) | Legislature cannot exercise judicial power |
| Judicial Review (Art. 32, 226, 136) | Kesavananda; Minerva Mills (1980) | Ouster clauses (Art. 329A, 368(4)) invalid |
| Rule of Law | Kesavananda; Indira Gandhi (1975) | No arbitrary power; equality before law |
| Free & Fair Elections | Indira Gandhi (1975); Kesavananda | Electoral integrity; Art. 329A struck down |
| Limited Amending Power | Minerva Mills (1980) | Parliament cannot expand its own amending power |
| Harmony FRs & DPSPs | Minerva Mills (1980) | Neither Part has absolute primacy |
| Judicial Independence / Primacy of CJI | NJAC (2015); Second Judges (1993) | Executive cannot have veto in appointments |
| Effective Access to Justice | Anita Kushwaha (2016) | Court fees, locus standi, procedural bars cannot deny justice |
9.8 PYQ Integration — Emergency & Basic Structure
- PYQ 2014: “The proclamation of Emergency under Article 352 is not immune from judicial review. Discuss.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2014
- PYQ 2015: “What is the basic structure doctrine? How has it evolved?” (15 marks) — PYQ 2015
- PYQ 2017: “Examine the scope of judicial review of President’s Rule under Article 356.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2017
- PYQ 2018: “The basic structure doctrine is a judicial innovation. Critically examine.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2018
- PYQ 2019: “Discuss the significance of the Kesavananda Bharati judgement in preserving the identity of the Constitution.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2019
- PYQ 2020: “Minerva Mills (1980) is a landmark in basic structure jurisprudence. Elucidate.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2020
- PYQ 2021: “The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was struck down for violating the basic structure. Discuss.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2021
- PYQ 2022: “Examine the impact of the 44th Amendment on Emergency provisions.” (10 marks) — PYQ 2022
- PYQ 2023: “The basic structure doctrine has been criticised as judicial overreach. Evaluate.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2023
- PYQ 2024: “Article 356 has been used more as a political tool than a constitutional remedy. Critically analyse in light of S.R. Bommai.” (15 marks) — PYQ 2024
10. Schedules of the Constitution
10.1 The Twelve Schedules and Their Articles
The Constitution originally contained eight Schedules; four more were added by amendment, making twelve in all. Each Schedule is part of the constitutional text and must be read with the Articles that refer to it.
- First Schedule — the names of the States and Union Territories, read with Articles 1 and 4.
- Second Schedule — the emoluments and allowances of the President, Governors, the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and the Comptroller and Auditor General.
- Third Schedule — the forms of oath or affirmation for ministers, members of legislatures, judges and other constitutional office-holders.
- Fourth Schedule — the allocation of seats in the Rajya Sabha to the States and Union Territories (Article 80).
- Fifth Schedule — the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in States other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram (Article 244(1)).
- Sixth Schedule — the administration of the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram through Autonomous District Councils and Regional Councils (Article 244(2)).
- Seventh Schedule — the three legislative lists: the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List, read with Article 246.
- Eighth Schedule — the languages recognised by the Constitution, twenty-two at present (Articles 344(1) and 351).
- Ninth Schedule — land reform and other laws shielded from judicial review by the First Amendment, 1951 (Article 31B).
- Tenth Schedule — the anti-defection provisions, added by the 52nd Amendment, 1985 (Articles 102(2) and 191(2)).
- Eleventh Schedule — the twenty-nine subjects within the functional domain of Panchayats, added by the 73rd Amendment, 1992 (Article 243G).
- Twelfth Schedule — the eighteen subjects within the functional domain of Municipalities, added by the 74th Amendment, 1992 (Article 243W).
10.2 The Ninth and Tenth Schedules, and Judicial Review
The Ninth Schedule deserves particular attention. It was inserted to shield land reform legislation from challenge, but in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) the Supreme Court held that even laws placed in the Ninth Schedule are open to challenge if they violate the basic structure of the Constitution, since the amending power under Article 368 cannot be used to destroy the Constitution’s essential features. The Tenth Schedule has likewise generated a large body of law on the Speaker’s power to decide disqualification questions under Articles 102(2) and 191(2). For the examination, the value of the Schedules lies less in memorising their order than in knowing the Article each is tied to and which amendment added the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth.
11. Official Language: Articles 343 to 351
11.1 Hindi, English and the Official Language of the Union
The Constitution distinguishes between the official language of the Union and the official languages of the States, and it nowhere declares any language to be a national language. Article 343 provides that the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script and that the international form of Indian numerals shall be used for official purposes. English was to continue for fifteen years from the commencement of the Constitution, but the Official Languages Act, 1963, allowed its continued use for the official purposes of the Union, and English remains the language of the higher judiciary and of much official correspondence. Article 344 provides for a Commission on Official Language and a Committee of Parliament to examine the Commission’s recommendations.
11.2 Language of the States, the Courts and Linguistic Minorities
Article 345 permits the legislature of a State to adopt one or more of the languages in use in the State, or Hindi, as the official language; until it does so, English continues. Article 346 governs the language of communication between one State and another and between a State and the Union; Article 347 allows the President to direct that a language spoken by a substantial section of the population of a State be recognised; and Article 348 requires that the proceedings of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, and the authoritative texts of Bills and Acts, be in English unless the legislature otherwise provides. Article 350 entitles a person to submit a representation for the redress of a grievance in any of the languages used in the Union or the State, Article 350A directs States to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage, and Article 350B provides for a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. Article 351 casts a duty on the Union to promote the spread of Hindi so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the composite culture of India.
11.3 The Eighth Schedule and the ‘National Language’ Trap
The Eighth Schedule lists the languages recognised by the Constitution. It contained fourteen languages originally; Sindhi was added in 1967, Konkani, Manipuri and Nepali in 1992, and Bodo, Dogri, Maithili and Santali in 2003, taking the total to twenty-two. Inclusion in the Eighth Schedule is important for the development of a language and for its use in official contexts, and the demand for inclusion by several other languages remains a live political issue. The distinction between an “official language” and a “national language” is a favourite examination trap: Hindi is the official language of the Union, not a national language, and the Constitution confers on no language the status of a national language.